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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, all particular systems have absorbed foreign 
influences, and the end result would therefore seem to be that no individual 
system today derives purely from its own particular roots. 1 
 In this Article, we lay out the broad outlines of the Maltese legal 
tradition.2  We first suggest approaching comparative research as the 
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 1. UGO MIFSUD BONNICI, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2004), 11.  “Some, 
however are more mixed, in that they contain a greater number of imported ingredients, than 
others.”  Id. at 36; see also id. at 38. 
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study of legal (and normative) mixtures and movements.  This study of 
‘hybridity and diffusion’ allows us to see the traditional taxonomies of 
comparative law in a new light.  All legal traditions are hybrids created in 
large part by the diffusion of laws and related doctrinal models across 
time and space.  Hybridity is, of course, especially obvious in the case of 
those jurisdictions identified as ‘mixed legal systems’.3  Malta’s legal 
tradition remains little known, but deserves greater attention.  It is, on its 
own terms, an interesting and informative instance of legal development 
and change.  Malta is the sort of “extraordinary place” that Esin Örücü 
has suggested allows comparatists to “best observe, analyse and 
understand the interaction between legal cultures and socio-cultures”.4  
While we may occasionally speak of the Maltese legal ‘system’ in this 
Article, this will usually refer rather narrowly to the current collection of 
Maltese positive law and legal institutions.  ‘Legal tradition’, as used here 
in line with the work of Patrick Glenn, is far more fluid and inclusive.5  
We recognize that legal traditions are neither closed nor static and 
include much more than the formal laws of the state.  That said, our focus 
in this Article is rather modest and traditional.  We will concentrate our 
attention on Maltese legal hybridity, its “happy union” of continental law 
(‘civil law’) and Anglo-American law (‘common law’). 
                                                                                                                  
 2. J.M. Ganado, British Public Law and the Civil Law in Malta, in CURRENT LEGAL 
PROBLEMS 1950:  VOLUME THREE (G.W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1950), 195.  “It 
is said that Maltese law has succeeded in making a happy union between British public law and 
its own private law, which belongs to the legal system derived from the Roman or the civil law.”  
Id. 
 3. See generally Seán Patrick Donlan, The Mediterranean Hybridity Project:  Crossing 
the Boundaries of Law and Culture, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 355 (2011).  The article is part of a special 
issue of the journal focusing on Mediterranean law, especially Maltese law.  The journal is 
available at www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?geaux=jcls.home (last visited 13 Apr. 2012).  It includes 
Donlan, Preface, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 233 (2011); Biagio Andò, The Role of Judges in the 
Development of Mixed Legal Systems:  The Case of Malta, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 237 (2011); and 
David Zammit, Maltese Court Delays and the Ethnography of Legal Practice, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 
539 (2011). 
 4. Esin Örücü, Comparatists and Extraordinary Places, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDIES:  TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003), 489.  
Note, however, that it is in such “‘extraordinary places’ that the comparatist of today is least 
equipped to work.”  Id. 
 5. Patrick Glenn, A Concept of Legal Tradition, 34 QUEEN’S L.J. 427 (2008); see also 
GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD:  SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW ((4th ed.) 2010); 
Legal Families and Traditions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Matthias 
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); and Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions, in 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Mark van Hoeke ed., 2004).  Cf. the 
use of ‘tradition’ in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (3d ed.) 
2007), 1-2. 
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 Other jurisdictions have, of course, been studied in a similar 
manner.  Twenty years ago, for example, Kenny Anthony attempted to 
establish criteria by which to judge the legal complexity of his native St 
Lucia.6  After underscoring the importance of history to this analysis, he 
wrote that 
ultimately identity may be ascertained by examining (1) the infrastructure 
of the legal system, (2) the substantive rules of law and their ranked 
sources, (3) the legal methodology employed in interpreting the substantive 
rules and their sources, (4) the legal style employed by the judiciary, and 
(5) the socio-legal culture within which the legal system thrives.  Extant 
definitions are mere guidelines to identification, and may not therefore be 
utilized as authoritative criteria.  In effect, the argument has been that, like 
all other legal systems, mixed systems have “not only an inner logic, but a 
history, a sociology, a psychology, and indeed a philosophy.”7 
It is true, of course, that such an approach may be applied to the study of 
any legal tradition, whether or not it is the product of an explicit mixing 
process.8  This has, however, seldom been very successful.9  In order to 
have more concrete measurements for our research, we have used the 
descriptive criteria first set out by Vernon Palmer a decade ago in his 
Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide:  The Third Legal Family (2001) and 
                                                 
 6. He wrote: 
Essentially, an attempt was made to suggest criteria by which the nature of mixed or 
hybrid legal systems may be determined.  The criteria will help to explain whether the 
mixed system is a permanent phenomenon or it is in transition from one legal tradition 
to another or is sustaining a duality or plurality of legal traditions.  In deciding these 
questions, it has been argued that the historical background of the legal system cannot 
be ignored. 
K.D. Anthony, The Identification and Classification of Mixed Systems of Law, in 
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LEGAL STUDIES:  A VOLUME OF ESSAYS TO COMMEMORATE THE 
21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE FACULTY OF LAW OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES (Gilbert 
Kodilinye & P.K. Menon eds., 1992), 217. 
 7. Id. at 217-18 (quoting A.G. Chloros, Common Law, Civil Law and Socialist Law:  
Three Legal Systems of the World, Three Kinds of Legal Thought, 9 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 11 
(1978-81)). 
 8. See, e.g., the discussion of legal ‘style’ in KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE AND EUROPEAN LAW (3d ed. 1998), 68. 
 9. But see the comparison of British and American legal traditions in P.S. ATIYAH & 
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987). 
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revisited in a number of publications since.10  This will be discussed in 
greater detail below.11 
 The next Part of the Article briefly discusses comparative law as the 
study of legal mixtures and movements, or ‘hybridity and diffusion’.  It 
explores the meaning of ‘mixed legal systems’ and lays out some of 
Palmer’s conclusions following his study of a number of ‘classical mixed 
jurisdictions’.  The third Part traces the complex background and 
development of the Maltese legal tradition:  its diverse history, the arrival 
of the British and the diffusion of their laws and institutions, and more 
recent changes in the jurisdiction.  The fourth Part looks more explicitly 
at the present Maltese system, especially its sources of law, its 
procedures, and its legal structures.  Palmer’s work is especially useful 
here.  Our conclusion summarizes Maltese legal hybridity, but it also 
suggests that Malta and other jurisdictions would benefit from a deeper 
analysis that goes beyond both the traditional taxonomies of comparative 
law and more recent, nuanced scholarship on mixed systems to 
investigate what one of us has referred to elsewhere as “placing state law 
within wider normative orders”.12  Overall, this Article reveals the 
peculiarities of Malta’s hybrid law and legal institutions.  It suggests that 
Malta has much to teach us about the manner in which legal traditions 
are created and maintained.  It also provides a foundation for the future 
study of both legal and normative hybridity in the archipelago.13 
                                                 
 10. VERNON PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE:  THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 
(2001); see Donlan, “A Thing Without Cohesion of Parts”:  The Professional and Pedagogical 
Contribution of Mixed Jurisdictions:  Review Article of VV Palmer (ed.), Mixed Jurisdictions 
Worldwide:  The Third Legal Family (2001); J Smits (ed.), The Contribution of Mixed Legal 
Systems to European Private Law (2002), 38 IRISH JURIST (new series) 383 (2003). 
 11. The work included reports on Israel, Louisiana, Quebec, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, 
Scotland, and South Africa.  “[O]ther[s] of this type”, he suggested, include Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Saint Lucia, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.  Palmer (2001), supra 
note 10, at 4 n.3.  Professor Palmer has, however, recently published a second edition.  Indeed 
after work on this Article began, a new Chapter 9 entitled “Malta” was prepared by Biagio Andò, 
Kevin Aquilina, Jotham Scerri-Diacono, and David Zammit.  See Vernon Valentine Palmer (ed.), 
MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE:  THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 
2012). 
 12. Donlan, Comparative Law and Hybrid Legal Traditions:  An Introduction, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND HYBRID LEGAL TRADITIONS (Eleanor Cashin-Ritaine, Donlan, & Martin 
Sychold eds., 2010), 18.  This was referred to there as the “study of hybrid legal traditions”.  Id. 
(emphasis in original); cf. WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT:  THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA (2d ed.) 2006). 
 13. The article is rooted in joint teaching, collaborative research, and the organization of a 
conference on Maltese and Mediterranean ‘hybridity’ (Malta, June 2010) and various individual 
publications.  See also Interview with Seán Patrick Donlan & David Zammit on Malta’s Mixed 
Legal System (15 October 2009), http://campusfm.um.edu.mt/pages/webcastspages/haqq_sewwa. 
htm (Program 17:  L-istudju tal-ligi (last visited 10 Mar. 2011)); Donlan, Black Sheep of the 
Family?:  Malta’s Mixed Jurisdiction and Vernon Palmer’s ‘Third Legal Family’ (9 June 2011), 
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II. HYBRIDITY AND DIFFUSION 
A. Mixtures and Movements 
 The approach to comparative law taken here might best be 
characterized as the study of both legal and normative mixtures and 
movements, of ‘hybridity and diffusion’.14  Hybridity and diffusion are, 
however, but two sides of the same coin.15  The former is merely a rough, 
static snapshot of the dynamism of the latter.  This is less a rigorous 
method than an enlightening perspective, a way of seeing things 
differently by looking critically at invented histories of ‘pure’ laws and 
discrete ‘families’ of ‘closed legal systems’.  Legal traditions are instead 
complex and dynamic.  In our wider project, we draw on both (i) existing 
research on mixed legal systems, where diverse state laws emerge from 
different legal traditions, and (ii) so-called ‘legal’ or ‘normative 
pluralism’.  The latter is often rooted in empirical study in the social 
sciences, but usually focused on non-Western nations, especially former 
colonies.  ‘Legal hybridity’, then, refers to state laws and legal principles, 
those elements—usually highly formalized and institutionalized—of a 
legal tradition recognized as properly legal by modern lawyers.  
‘Normative hybridity’ is a far wider concept, largely synonymous with 
‘normative pluralism’ and including both laws and wider patterns of 
normative ordering and non-state norms.  This approach combines the 
work of mixed jurists, other comparatists, and social scientists.  It doesn’t 
prescribe hybridity, but sees it instead as a social fact that must be 
acknowledged in our work as comparatists.  We have, however, limited 
ourselves here to Maltese legal hybridity, much of which is explicit, if 
unexplored outside of the jurisdiction.  The investigation of its normative 
hybridity is a future, and necessarily interdisciplinary, project. 
 Neither the hybridity nor the diffusion of laws is new.16  Within 
Europe, law predated the state and the creation of genuinely national 
                                                                                                                  
http://ccweb.law.lsu.edu/Panopto/Pages/Viewer/Default.aspx?id=c0d88c19-d8f6-4f20-9ef4-c711b 
4ff0da7 (last visited 18 Mar. 2012). 
 14. The approach grew, in part, out of discussions in Juris Diversitas, an international 
legal community dedicated to (i) the study of legal and normative mixtures and movements and 
(ii) the encouragement of interdisciplinary dialogue between jurists and others.  See 
www.jurisdiversitas.blogsot.com.  For more information on ‘hybridity and diffusion’, see Donlan 
(2011), supra note 3. 
 15. See Örücü, Mixed and Mixing Systems:  A Conceptual Search, in STUDIES IN LEGAL 
SYSTEMS:  MIXED AND MIXING (Örücü, Elspeth Attwooll, & Sean Coyle eds., 1996), especially 
341-344. 
 16. See Donlan, Remembering:  Legal Hybridity and Legal History, 2 COMP. L. REV. 
(2011), available at http://www.comparativelawreview.com/ojs/index.php/CoLR/article/view/13; 
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laws.  A legal ‘system’ centered on the modern nation-state, and the 
elimination of competing jurisdictions and marginalization of non-legal 
norms was a very long historical process.  Especially before the 
nineteenth century, there were multiple contemporaneous legal orders co-
existing in the same geographical space and at the same time.  Modern 
national traditions are unique hybrids rooted in diverse customary or 
folk-laws, summary and discretionary jurisdictions, local and particular 
iura propria, the romano-canonical ‘learned laws’ or ius commune, and 
other trans-territorial iura communia (including feudal law and the lex 
mercatoria).  Over time, these various bodies of law were linked to public 
institutions and increasingly meaningful and centralized powers of 
enforcement.  They only slowly came under the control of early modern 
states to form modern legal traditions, contributing much to the 
substance and subsequent success of common laws.  Similar patterns of 
hybridity occurred with the diffusion of European law, often through 
colonialism, around the world.17  Similarly, the exceptional legal hybridity 
of the Mediterranean region was produced in a complex history of 
conquest, colonization, and social and legal diffusion across shifting and 
porous political boundaries.  Malta’s legal tradition explicitly reflects this 
complexity.  The recognition of historical and comparative hybridity 
allows us both to better understand nominally ‘pure’ legal traditions and 
to better contextualize modern traditions identified as mixed. 
 The crude classifications of much past and present comparative 
study—positivist, centralist, monist—have often resulted in pushing 
contemporary legal traditions designated as ‘mixed legal systems’, those 
explicitly joining elements of different pan-national legal traditions, “into 
a marginal and uncertain position”.18  But such legal hybridity is not 
especially unique.  The ubiquity of hybridity reveals the significant 
limitations of traditional comparative taxonomies.19  Explicitly mixed 
systems are merely the most obvious hybrids.  Indeed, the mixture of 
laws is so common that Palmer has suggested that “[a] useful 
                                                                                                                  
Histories of Hybridity:  A Problem, a Primer, a Plea, and a Plan (of Sorts), in Cashin-Ritaine et 
al., supra note 12, at 21-34. 
 17. Indeed, “[s]cholars who study the one could learn from those who study the other, and 
vice versa.”  Dirk Heirbaut, Europe and the People Without Legal History:  On the Need for a 
General History of Non-European Law, 68 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIENDENIS 69, 277 
(2008). 
 18. Luigi Moccia, Historical Overview on the Origins and Attitudes of Comparative Law, 
in THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION (Bruno De Witte & 
Caroline Forder eds., 1992), 619 n.14; see also Åke Malmström, The System of Legal Systems:  
Notes on a Problem of Classification in Comparative Law, 13 SCAN. STUD. L. 129, 148 (1969). 
 19. See generally Jaakko Husa, Legal Families, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006). 
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classification scheme ought to begin with their centrality as a point of 
departure.”20  Even if we focus only on overtly mixed systems, we find 
that hybridity is not the exception, but “the rule”.21  An inventory of the 
world’s jurisdictions recently compiled by the University of Ottawa lists 
over ninety legal systems that explicitly contain components drawn from 
different pan-national legal traditions.22  Indeed, for two decades Esin 
Örücü has pressed the expansion of research to more exotic, often non-
Western, hybrids.23  But while all traditions are mixed, there is a 
meaningful division to be made “between what may be termed mixed 
and that which has already been blended to an extent that origins of rules 
are lost in ordinary legal practice.  The distinction is therefore at once a 
practical and a psychological one . . . .”24  While the dividing line between 
these might be better seen as a fuzzy border between implicit and explicit 
mixes, it nevertheless remains useful. 
 The marginal status of mixed legal systems within comparative law 
has begun to change.  In the last decade, scholars have increasingly 
focused on mixed systems or, at least, the explicitly European hybrids 
among them.  It has also been suggested that these explicitly mixed 
systems can serve as models or guides for other systems in the century to 
come.25  This is especially true in Europe, given the development of a 
modern pan-European law with roots in Anglo-American law, 
continental legal systems of various types, as well as various Nordic and 
Central European legal traditions.26  More specifically, it has been argued 
                                                 
 20. Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems . . . and the Myth of Pure Laws, 67 LA. L. REV. 1205, 
1211 (2007). 
 21. Jacques du Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in 
Reimann & Zimmermann, supra note 5, at 481; see also Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants 
and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 723 (2009, part of a 
special issue on Histories of Legal Transplantations). 
 22. Classification of Legal Systems and Corresponding Political Entities, available at 
www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/index-syst.php (last visited 10 Mar. 2011). 
 23. See most recently, Örücü, What Is a Mixed Legal System:  Exclusion or Expansion?, 
in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS AT NEW FRONTIERS (Örücü ed., 2010).  See generally Cashin-Ritaine et 
al., supra note 12. 
 24. Joseph McKnight, Some Historical Observations on Mixed Systems of Law, 22 
JURIDICAL REV. (new series) 177, 186 (1977); see also Ignazio Castellucci, How Mixed Must a 
Mixed System Be?, 12 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2008), available at http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-
4.pdf (last visited 10 Mar. 2011)).  See generally Örücü (1996), supra note 15. 
 25. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism:  Comparative Law 
Sets Boundaries, 31 ARIZONA STATE L.J. 737, 748 (1999); Jean-Louis Baudouin, Mixed 
Jurisdictions:  A Model for the XXIst Century, 63 LA. L. REV. 983 (2003). 
 26. See Hein Kötz, The Value of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 435 (2003); Ivan 
Sammut, The EU and Maltese Legal Orders:  What Kind of Marriage Between Them?, in MALTA 
IN THE EU:  FIVE YEARS ON AND LOOKING TO THE FUTURE (Peter Xuereb ed., 2009); cf. MARTIJN 
W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE (2001), 68-69. 
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that mixed systems suggest what a future European common law, a 
novum ius commune Europaeum, might look like.27  Malta, a jurisdiction 
in which Anglo-American, or rather Anglo-British, laws and institutions 
were superimposed on a wider continental base, is most usefully 
approached through contemporary scholarship on mixed legal systems.  
As a member of the European Union (E.U., 2004) and a signatory of The 
European Convention of Human Rights (E.C.H.R., 1987), it is also 
experiencing an additional overlay of hybrid pan-European laws that 
make its legal sources still more varied.  The explicit nature of these 
developments in the Maltese legal tradition and the relatively early and 
continuous interaction between Anglo-American and continental 
traditions in its colonial history makes Malta a useful exemplar of legal 
hybridity, at least for other hybrids of predominantly European or 
Western laws.28 
 But the discussion of mixed systems can be confusing.29 In current 
research, ‘mixed legal systems’ is generally used for those jurisdictions 
that contain significant and explicitly segregated elements of different 
pan-national legal traditions.30  It remains a residual, catch-all category 
for those traditions that cannot be assigned elsewhere and can cover any 
mix, whether Western or non-Western.  ‘Mixed jurisdictions’ may also 
sometimes be used in this general manner or for any mixture of Anglo-
American and continental laws.31  It is most often, however, applied to a 
                                                 
 27. See SMITS, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW:  TOWARD A IUS COMMUNE 
EUROPAEUM AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM (2002); Smits, Introduction:  Mixed Legal Systems and 
European Private Law, in THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE 
LAW (Smits ed., 2001). 
 28. Cf. the divisions in Mark van Hoeke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures:  Legal 
Paradigms and Legal Doctrine:  Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 495 (1998).  The authors divide legal traditions into ‘cultural families’, including:  African, 
Asian, Islamic, and Western.  Id. at 502 et seq. 
 29. The vocabulary of ‘mixity’ is “basically an accident of history.”  Palmer, Mixed 
Jurisdictions, in Smits (2006), supra note 19, at 467 (referring to ‘mixed jurisdictions’).  In two 
articles, Palmer has traced the genealogy of this terminology.  See Palmer, Two Rival Theories of 
Mixed Legal Systems, in Örücü (2010), supra note 23, and Palmer’s concise, but detailed 
synopsis in Quebec and Her Sisters in the Third Legal Family, 54 MCGILL L.J./ REVUE DROIT DE 
MCGILL 321, 324-32 (2009).  Note that the former is also available in 3 J. COMP. L. 7 (2008) and 
(2008) 12 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2008, http://www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-16.html (last visited 10 Mar. 
2011)). 
 30. For example, a list prepared and posted online by the University of Ottawa, uses 
‘mixed legal systems’ to cover various collections of ‘civil law’, ‘common law’, ‘customary law’, 
‘Muslim law’, and ‘Jewish law’.  See www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/sys-mixtes.php 
(last visited 10 Mar. 2011). 
 31. See Smith, Mixed Jurisdictions, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW:  VOLUME 6—PROPERTY AND TRUST (Konrad Zweigert & Ulrich Drobnig eds.,1974), 115, 
no. 228; Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of the 
Genius of Scots Private Law, 114 L.Q. REV. 228, 228 (1998).  By this latter definition, however, 
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narrower subset of Western mixes that dominate scholarship.  Used in 
this way, ‘mixed jurisdictions’ refers to situations in which (i) continental 
laws are “overlaid” or “suffused” with Anglo-American laws later in 
time32 or where (ii) continental private law is joined to Anglo-American 
public and criminal law.  For historical reasons, the first has usually 
resulted in the second.  The so-called ‘classical mixed jurisdictions’ are 
roughly the same, referring to specific jurisdictions—Louisiana, Puerto 
Rico, Quebec, Scotland, and South Africa—on which significant 
scholarship has long existed.33  Palmer sees these ‘classical mixed 
jurisdictions’ as largely synonymous with what he has more recently 
called the ‘third legal family’ (between the well-known Anglo-American 
and continental legal ‘families’).34  His thesis, and the extended 
jurisdictional reports he has commissioned, has proven extremely useful 
in the analysis of legal hybridity.  A recent, concise formulation of this 
deserves to be quoted at length: 
I offer the concept of the third legal family as a way of highlighting the 
common traits, shared issues, and basic resemblance of this collection of 
systems.  The existence of the following commonalities, which at the same 
time constitute individualities from a group standpoint, form the empirical 
core of my claim. 
(1) In each situation, a civil law that was shared by Roman and canon 
law was implanted in a far-flung province of the old jus commune, a 
tide of common law influence later ensured, and a neo-civilian 
reaction to that influence occurred in the twentieth century. . . . 
(2) In each system, prototypical Anglo-American judicial institutions 
were in charge of applying the civil law, meaning that judges with 
more creative mindsets and greater inherent powers at their disposal 
                                                                                                                  
seemingly pure Anglo-American jurisdictions might be classified as mixed given their past 
borrowing from pan-European legal traditions.  Cf. Donlan, “All This Together Make Up Our 
Common Law”:  Legal Hybridity in England and Ireland, 1704-1804, in Örücü (2010), supra note 
23, at 265-91.  There is also ongoing borrowing, through European law, in Britain and Ireland. 
 32. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’, in CIVIL 
LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965), 1; FREDERICK P. 
WALTON, THE SCOPE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOWER CANADA (1980 [1907]), 
1.  Note that, in Israel, Anglo-American law was overlaid with continental law rather than the 
other way around.  See Stephen Goldstein, Israel, in Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 448-68. 
 33. This terminological plasticity arguably impedes more accurate classification and 
effective communication.  See Donlan (2010), supra note 12, at 12-18. 
 34. Note, however, that, used in this manner, ‘classical mixed jurisdiction’ seems to be an 
historical classification, whereas the ‘third legal family’ is conceptual.  It would be possible to 
belong to one group but not the other.  If, for example, a general consensus developed that 
Louisiana had become a reasonably ‘pure’ Anglo-American jurisdiction, it would remain the 
former but not the latter.  On the other hand, if a contemporary jurisdiction were to meet, for the 
first time, the requirements of the ‘third legal family’, they would still never be ‘classical mixed 
jurisdiction’. 
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interpreted the civil law.  In the process of judicial interpretation, the 
substance of the law was insensibly reshaped by actors and 
institutions which did not pretend to be neutral conduits. . . . 
(3) Everywhere in the mixed jurisdiction world, civil procedure is 
adversarial along Anglo-American lines.  The emphasis of that 
procedure is upon the remedy rather than the right, and this has left a 
visible imprint on substantive civil law, which emphasizes the right 
rather than the remedy. 
(4) Whether the mixed system was codified or not, court decisions in 
mixed jurisdictions are accorded more precedential value than in 
traditional civilian jurisdictions.  Indeed, in three mixed legal systems, 
court decisions are openly accepted as an official source of law, 
second only to legislation. 
(5) Quebec aside, common law influence on the civil law follows a 
discernible and predictable pattern, penetrating the most porous 
points of entry, such as general clauses in the law of delict, while 
leaving resistant institutions like property law relatively unaffected.  
The phenomenon of the second reception of common law and its 
higher forms of creativity (original or autonomous law) is restricted 
to this group. . . . 
(6) Commercial law follows market dynamics.  Anglo-American 
commercial law has everywhere replaced the law of merchants 
originally in place, partly because of relatively weaker cultural 
attachment to commercial rules, but more decisively because of 
pressure to conform to the dominant surrounding economy. 
(7) Special cultural forces shape the jurists and the legal literature they 
produce.  Categories of jurists called purists, pollutionists, and 
pragmatists are, or once were, apparent.  The orientations are closely 
tied to national descent, maternal tongue, and legal education.  
Internal legal history and historical periods are delineated by the 
fortunes and fervor of these cultural alignments. 
(8) Mixed systems resemble each other in the circumstances of their 
birth and in the ultimate reasons for their existence.35 
While we have not followed this approach slavishly, Palmer’s conclusions 
have been of considerable importance to this work.  Indeed, it began as 
an attempt to compare Malta to the members of the ‘third legal family’. 
B. Malta’s Happy Union? 
 The Republic of Malta covers a small archipelago consisting of 
three inhabited islands, the most important being Malta and Gozo.  The 
islands cover only some three-hundred square kilometers.  Sicily sits less 
                                                 
 35. Palmer (2009), supra note 29, at 343-44. 
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than one-hundred kilometers to its north and has long played an 
important part in Maltese history.  But Tunisia to its west and Libya to 
the south are not much farther away.  Malta’s population is approximately 
412,000 and overwhelmingly Catholic.  This fact is another important 
element of its past.  In its present form, Malta fits neatly into 
contemporary European political patterns.  It has only been independent 
of the United Kingdom, however, since 1964 and remains a member of 
the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’ (formerly known as the ‘British 
Commonwealth’).  Politically, Malta is a constitutional republic with a 
formal, codified (and quite lengthy) constitution.  It has a parliamentary 
system of government with a President selected by a unicameral 
legislature (the House of Representatives or Kamra tad-Deputati).  Two 
parties—the Nationalist Party (Partit Nazzjonalista) and the Labour Party 
(Partit Laburista)—have dominated the House of Representatives.  As in 
most parliamentary systems of government, the powers of the Maltese 
President are largely ceremonial.  Real authority resides with the 
‘Government’, the executive, in a Westminster-style system.  The 
division of state responsibilities, the ‘separation of powers’, is generally 
consistent with parliamentary government.  Malta is, however, with the 
Channel Islands, Cyprus, and Scotland, one of a handful of explicitly 
‘mixed legal systems’ within the E.U..  This experience with both of the 
dominant Western legal traditions has, as Mifsud Bonnici put it, “forced 
Maltese jurists to become natural comparatists”.36  But the comparative 
sensitivity of Maltese jurists has not often resulted in published 
scholarship that places its law in comparative context.37  The significance 
of Maltese hybridity has instead remained largely implicit in legal 
education.  If the mixed nature of the legal tradition has been recognized 
in passing outside of Malta, the explicit study of mixed systems has also, 
until relatively recently, largely bypassed the island.  As with other 
traditions, determining its appropriate taxonomical classification—if 
such classifications make sense at all—is complex.38  As Palmer has 
                                                 
 36. Mifsud Bonnici, supra note 1, at xiii. 
 37. For recent publications on Maltese law, see, e.g., ANDREW MUSCAT, PRINCIPLES OF 
MALTESE COMPANY LAW (2007); Max Ganado (ed.), AN INTRODUCTION TO MALTESE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES LAW (2009), and SIMONE BORG & LOUISE FARRUGIA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MALTA 
(2010).  There are, however, rumors of other projects in the works. 
 38. Cf. Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 7, 7 n.1 
(2003, describing the Channel Islands, Cyprus, and Malta as ‘mixed jurisdictions’).  Each of these 
is, in fact, quite distinct, both from one another and the ‘classical mixed jurisdictions’.  Cyprus, 
for example, mixes Anglo-American private law with continental public and criminal law.  See 
also Symeon C. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic of Cyprus, 78 TUL. L. 
REV. 441 (2003). 
 
 
 
 
176 TULANE EUROPEAN & CIVIL LAW FORUM [Vol. 27 
 
noted, classification of a system as mixed is subjective.39  There is no 
simple and objective formula.  Indeed, William Tetley has written that 
“[f]acetiously, one might . . . define a mixed jurisdiction as a place where 
debate over the subject takes place.”40  There’s neither much debate nor 
anxiety about Maltese hybridity in Malta. 
 Indeed, this may be true because Malta is arguably a “weak 
tradition” that has experienced numerous powerful external influences in 
the past.41  Such a situation is perhaps unavoidable in small jurisdictions.42  
In discussing the Channel Islands, George Gretton and Kenneth Reid 
wrote that “[s]mall legal systems, not generating enough law of their 
own, must borrow to survive.”43  Alternatively, of course, we may see this 
less as a rational response to limited options as the imposition of 
dominant models by elites of various types.  The question as to whether 
there is, beneath the borrowings from numerous external sources, a ‘deep 
structure’ native or natural to the Maltese is a complex question that 
cannot be answered here.44  As noted, in Malta, it’s generally accurate to 
say that, in substantive law, continental private laws were overlaid with 
Anglo-British public law.  But this statement does not do complete 
                                                 
 39. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 17; see also Palmer (2006), supra note 29, at 468. 
 40. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions:  Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 680 (2000). 
 41. Pier Giuseppe Monateri, The ‘Weak’ Law:  Contaminations and Legal Cultures, in 
ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE XVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
BRISTOL (1998); see especially id., 97 et seq. (discussing Italy).  For Monateri, legal complexity is 
common and occurs through a very fluid, fragmented, and “decentralized” borrowing of laws and 
legal institutions or “contamination”.  Id. at 107; cf. Monateri, CARDOZO ELEC. L. BULLETIN 
(2005, www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/review/home.html (last visited 10 Mar. 2011)).  On Italy as a 
‘weak tradition’, see also Monateri & F.A. Chiaves, Shifting Frames:  Law and Legal 
‘Contaminations’, in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW (Jeffrey S. Lena & Ugo Mattei eds., 2002).  
On ‘contamination’, see also Olivier Moréteau, An Introduction to Contamination, 3 J. CIV. L. 
STUD. 9 (2010). 
 42. Andrew Grossman, Finding the Law:  The Micro-States and Small Jurisdictions of 
Europe:  Andorra, Cyprus, Northern Cyprus, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Monaco, Montenegro, San Marino, Vatican State; UK European dependencies:  Channel Islands, 
Gibraltar, Isle of Man; Faroe Islands and Greenland, available at www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/ 
Microstates.htm (last visited 10 Mar. 2011).  Over twenty years ago, Michael Bogdan wrote that 
“[a]mong the many interesting research problems of a general nature found within the area of 
comparative law, two complex issues are particularly fascinating, . . . :  the problem of mixed 
(hybrid) legal systems and the problem of the so-called ‘small jurisdictions’.”  THE LAW OF 
MAURITIUS AND SEYCHELLES:  A STUDY OF TWO SMALL MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS (1989). 
 43. George Gretton & Kenneth Reid, The Civil Law Tradition:  Some Thoughts from 
North of the Tweed, JERSEY & GUERNSEY L. REV. (2007, available at www.jerseylaw.je/Publications/ 
jerseylawreview/Oct07/JLR0710_Gretton.aspx).  “To plan the future, therefore, one must first map 
the past.”  Id. 
 44. KAARLO TOURI, CRITICAL LEGAL PLURALISM (2002), 150.  Touri contrasts the 
‘surface level’ of the law and the ‘legal culture’ with the ‘deep structure, which represents the long 
durée of the law.’  Id. 
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justice to Maltese mixity.  The jurisdiction combines an essentially 
continental substantive private law, particularly as expressed in modern 
codifications in the French manner, with significant French and Italian 
influence and some British borrowings.45  The impact of British law is 
especially strong in certain areas, including company and maritime law.  
Commercial law originally owed much to French and Italian law, but has 
seen significant reception of Anglo-British concepts in the last half-
century.  Canon law, submerged but essential to all Western legal 
traditions, plays a more obvious role in Malta.  There, canon law remains 
“part of the civil law . . . in the matter of the celebration and dissolution 
of marriage”.46  The decisions of Maltese Ecclesiastical Tribunals have 
civil effects.  Maltese procedural law is also quite complex.  Its civil 
procedures are still in important respects ‘investigative’ (or ‘inquisi-
torial’) in the continental manner, while its criminal procedures owe 
more to British law, not least the use of a jury in serious matters.  Malta’s 
criminal justice system is, or so it has been argued, “a felicitous fusion of 
continental and English elements.”47  Its substantive criminal law is 
probably also best seen as a unique blend of continental traditions, 
especially the Italian, with British influence.  Public law is more clearly 
British in both form and substance.48  Even here, however, elements of 
continental and European law have been important.  The latter includes 
the laws of both of the E.U. (and its predecessors) and the E.C.H.R..  
Indeed, E.U. law was important before Malta’s accession.  Since the 
British joined the E.U. in the 1970s, its law has acted as the gateway for 
European law to enter Malta.  Finally, linguistic factors have, both in the 
past and in the present, played an important role in Malta.  While Maltese 
was widely spoken, Italian was, for centuries, the language of learning 
and the law.  Today, Maltese—or a legal Maltese heavily influenced by 
                                                 
 45. J.M. Ganado, The Contribution of the Privy Council on Questions of Maltese Civil 
Law, in LAW, JUSTICE AND EQUITY:  ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO GW KEETON (R.H. Code Holland & G. 
Schwarzenberger eds., 1967); cf. Maurice Sheldon Amos, The Common Law and the Civil Law 
in the British Commonwealth of Nations, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (1937). 
 46. Edwin Busuttil, Malta, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW:  
VOLUME 1—NATIONAL REPORTS (Viktor Knapp ed., 1981), M-48.  For a more recent overview, 
see also Sylvia G. Maier, Malta, in LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD:  A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND 
CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA—VOLUME III:  M-R (Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 2002). 
 47. J.J. Cremona, The Jury System in Malta, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 570, 572 (1964).  The 
Criminal Code has been called a ‘happy blend of continental philosophical thought and the liberal 
principles of English common law.’  Albert Ganado, Homage in Venice to the Maltese Criminal 
Code of 1854—Part I, SUNDAY TIMES OF MALTA, Dec. 7, 2003, at 56.  The same author said that 
these were “applied in keeping with Maltese customs and traditions.”  Albert Ganado, The 
Maltese Criminal Code of 1854—Part II, SUNDAY TIMES OF MALTA, Dec. 14, 2003, at 54, 55. 
 48. CREMONA, THE MALTESE CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY SINCE 1813 
(2d ed. 1997); see also WALLACE PH. GULIA, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY IN MALTA (1974). 
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Italian—is the language of the courts and jurisprudence while English is 
widespread and the primary language of legal education.  Italian is still 
widely known and important to Maltese legal history, but has no official 
status as such.  As with other traditions, large and small alike, the precise 
character of Maltese hybridity is not static, but changing in the face of 
new influences and novel challenges.49 
III. THE PAST 
A. Before the British50 
 The comparatist Maurice Tancelin wrote, in discussing Quebec, that 
“[i]f a system is attached to two families . . . the question is one of 
genealogy, and thus of historical research first of all.”51  Maltese history is 
complex.  It reveals a rich variety of legal and social influences.  Leaving 
aside early settlements before the first millennium BC, the island was 
settled in turn by the Phoenicians and the Carthaginians, the latter the 
heir and previous colony of the former.  The Maltese fell under Roman 
control in 218 BC as a result of the Punic Wars (264-146 BC) between 
the Carthaginians and the Romans.  With the division of the Roman 
Empire in Western and Eastern halves in the late fourth century, Malta 
remained under the authority of the Greek-speaking Byzantine Empire 
for almost four centuries (395-870).  The island later fell, with Sicily, to 
the Arabs in the tenth century as a result of long-running Byzantine-Arab 
Wars (780-1180).  Arab rule lasted for two centuries until the Normans 
took Malta, again with Sicily, in 1090/1.  Indeed, from the Roman period, 
Malta had been closely linked to legal and political developments in the 
Italian peninsula and Sicily.  Within the limits of its local laws and the 
juristic development of the Romano-canonical ius commune, the laws 
enacted by Sicilian rulers applied to Malta.  Both laws and legal 
documents were drafted in Latin rather than in Maltese, a Semitic 
language much influenced by Sicilian.  With Sicily, Malta was brought 
under the rule of the Swabians (the House of Hohenstaufen, 1194-1266, 
                                                 
 49. Örücü includes Malta as a “simple mix”, but distinct from Palmer’s ‘mixed 
jurisdictions’.  Örücü, (2010) supra note 23, Annex, 75.  Using her terminology, the Maltese mix 
is ‘overt’, ‘structured’, ‘simple’, and ‘blended’.  See also Örücü, Family Trees for Legal Systems:  
Towards a Contemporary Approach, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY IN COMPARATIVE 
LAW (Mark Van Hoecke ed., 2004), 367 (citing J.M. Ganado, Malta:  Microcosm of International 
Influences, in Örücü et al., supra note 15, at 225-47); Örücü (2010), supra note 23, at 64-65. 
 50. Cf. the ‘nine distinct legal epochs’ of Maltese legal history in Kevin Aquilina, 
Rethinking Maltese Legal Hybridity:  A Chimeric Illusion or a Healthy Grafted European Law 
Mixture?, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 261 (2011). 
 51. Maurice Tancelin, How Can a Legal System Be a Mixed System, in Walton, supra 
note 32, at 3. 
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part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation) and briefly the 
Capetian House of Anjou (1266-82) until the War of the Sicilian Vespers 
(1282) brought both under the Aragonese (1282-1409).  Both Sicily and 
Malta were ruled by the Crown of Aragon and later that of Spain with the 
Aragonese union with the Crown of Castile.  In 1530, Charles I of Spain 
(Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire) presented the islands to the 
Order of Knights of St John in exchange for the presentation of one 
falcon each year.  Only a generation or so later, in 1565, Malta would 
withstand a large Ottoman army in the ‘Great Siege’.  A similar assault 
had earlier dislodged the Knights from Rhodes.  The victory in Malta 
secured the islands for Christendom. 
 The Knights, foreigners to Malta, were divided into several 
‘langues’ or divisions based on language and national identity.  As 
elsewhere across the continent, they applied laws that increasingly relied 
on conceptual structures and supplementary rules of the ‘learned laws’ or 
‘ius commune’.  Especially in its Italian forms, the revived and revised 
Roman law of the universities plus canon law and even feudal law, was 
important in Malta, though altered by contact with local laws and 
customs.52  Malta’s pre-modern codifications reflect these influences as 
well as the commercial common laws of the lex mercatoria (the ‘Law 
Merchant’).  In the eighteenth century, the Codice Manoel (1723) was 
followed by the Codice Municipale di Malta (1784).  The latter is better 
known as the Code de Rohan, as it was redacted or compiled by the 
French Grand Master De Rohan-Polduc (1725-97).  Although the Code 
was subsequently replaced by other legislation in the nineteenth century, 
it is still seen to be of special importance for contemporary Maltese law.53  
                                                 
 52. See HUGH W. HARDING, HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW IN MALTA (1950); see also M. 
Borg Olivier, A Maltese Legal Library in the XVIth Century, 7 MELITA HISTORICA 282 (1971). 
 53. See, e.g., PAOLO DE BONO, SOMMARIO DELLA STORIA DELLA LEGISLAZIONE MALTESE 
(1897), 75; see also DE BONO, IL FALLIMENTO NEL DIRITTO MALTESE (1907).  The contemporary 
status of the Code de Rohan is unclear, but “it has been argued that [the Code] is still residually 
operative today” and “[i]t would seem that this opinion has not been refuted.”  Mark A. Sammut, 
The Place of the Codice Municipale di Malta in European Legal History, 20 ID-DRITT 330 
(2009), 330, 330 n.505 (citing H.W. HARDING, MALTESE LEGAL HISTORY UNDER BRITISH RULE 
1801-36 (1968) at 2 et seq.).  This opinion is also held by noted contemporary jurists in Malta.  In 
essence, lacunae in the modern Maltese Civil Code may lead to the Code de Rohan, at least 
where other subsequent, extra-codal statutes—and perhaps even jurisprudence, though formally 
non-binding—doesn’t apply.  Indeed, because the Code de Rohan was a pre-modern code rooted 
in the ius commune as applied in Malta, such lacunae provides a gateway to the wider medieval 
traditions.  These pre-modern codes or ‘digests’ served as restatements of law; they need not 
abrogate prior law and doctrine or appear as comprehensive and gapless.  For the importance of 
the difference between a ‘digest’ and a ‘code’, not least in a mixed system, see VERNON PALMER, 
THE LOUISIANA CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE:  CRITIQUES OF CODIFICATION IN A MIXED JURISDICTION 
(2005). 
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In these pre-modern codes, where they were silent on a matter of law, 
reference was made to the wider scholarship of the ius commune, at least 
as applied in the jurisdiction.54  This existing legal hybridity was to be 
reduced by the clarity of legal sources demanded by legal nationalism, 
centralism, and positivism in the nineteenth century.  In the same period, 
however, Anglo-British law would be overlaid on this broad and varied 
continental foundation.55  The portrait of Maltese judges is this period is 
not, on the whole, positive.56  The Italian jurist Giandonato Rogadeo, 
invited by de Rohan to visit Malta in the interest of law reform, found 
“covert and stealthy opposition to his proposals for reform from a 
conservative legal establishment which had substantial vested interests to 
defend.”57  The publication of Rogadeo’s Ragionamenti sul regolamento 
della giustizia in Malta (1780) touched off a war of words between him 
and Maltese jurists. 
 In 1798, Malta was seized by Napoleon Bonaparte, not yet First 
Consul of France, en route to his Egyptian campaign.  This brought two-
and-a-half centuries of the rule of the Knights to an end.  The French 
republicans were hostile towards Catholicism and began to confiscate the 
island’s wealth.  In addition to coordinating native resistance, a Maltese 
National Congress appealed, through ‘His Sicilian Majesty’, to the 
British fleet for assistance.58  The National Congress also issued a 
Dichiarazione dei Diritti degli abitanti di Malta e Gozo (the Declaration 
of Rights of the inhabitants of Malta and Gozo) in the same year.59  The 
French surrendered in 1800.  In requesting British assistance, the Maltese 
appear to have wanted a “protector rather than [a] sovereign”.60  Piecing 
together an accurate historical account of the period is not easy.  Formal 
legal documents are insufficient on their own.  Other factors, not least 
both British and Maltese nationalism, also color the historiography of 
British rule.  In the context of public law, Hilda Lee argued: 
                                                 
 54. Sammut, supra note 53, at 334-35. 
 55. As Patrick Glenn has noted, the “concept” of a mixed system is “very recent”.  
Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J./REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL 261, 271 (1987).  This is the 
“hidden temporal dimension” in the categorization of mixed systems.  Glenn, Quebec:  Mixité 
and Monism, in Örücü et al., supra note 15, at 1. 
 56. Ganado (1996), supra note 49, at 228. 
 57. Giovanni Bonello, Notes for a History of the Judiciary at the Time of the Order, in 
HISTORIES OF MALTA:  CONFESSIONS AND TRANSGRESSIONS—VOLUME NINE (Bonello ed., 2008), 
151. 
 58. See Ganado (1996), supra note 49, at 229. 
 59. Included as Appendix B, in Cremona (1997), supra note 48, at 123-25; see also J.J. 
CREMONA, SELECTED PAPERS 1946-1989 (1990). 
 60. CARMEL CASSAR, A CONCISE HISTORY OF MALTA (2000), 146. 
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The constitution cannot be seen simply as a politico-legal institution; 
reference must be made to the general Colonial policy to which Britain was 
committed at the time, to the character of the Colonial Secretary, to the 
power and influence of his permanent officials in the Colonial Office, to 
the personality and policy of the Governor and his officials, to the 
economic and social conditions on the island which they governed, to the 
degree of political education of the Maltese people; and over and above all 
these factors, providing as it were the framework into which they must all 
conform, the historian must be aware of the essential character of the island 
as a strategic base.  A study of the Malta constitution, therefore, presents a 
task which is complex and fascinating.61 
The study of Malta’s private and criminal law, both substantive and 
procedural, is no less ‘complex and fascinating’. 
B. After the Diffusion of British Law 
 After the expulsion of the French, the British exercised de facto 
political control over the archipelago.62  Given the British failure to 
restore the islands to the rule of the Knights, as they had bound 
themselves to do by the Treaty of Amiens, de jure sovereignty seems 
initially to have continued to vest in the King of the Two Sicilies.  From 
1800 to 1815, Malta was effectively a British protectorate.  It was 
subsequently administered as a British colony.  As a result of this British 
connection, lasting another century and a half, Malta does “resemble” the 
jurisdictions of the ‘third legal family’ both “in the circumstances of their 
birth and in the ultimate reasons for their existence.”63  The complexities 
of Anglo-British law were superimposed on the existing bricolage—or 
mescolanza—of continental traditions in Malta.  The precise nature of 
the transition to British rule, however, remains contentious and has been 
subject to different historical and legal interpretations.64  The Maltese 
historian Carmel Cassar has written, for example, that the island “was 
given to Britain as a possession by the Treaty of Paris in 1814, a measure 
that was ratified in June 1815 at the Congress of Vienna and confirmed 
in Paris in November 1815.  The Maltese had absolutely no say in this 
                                                 
 61. Hilda I. Lee, The Development of the Malta Constitution 1813-1849, 1 MELITA 
HISTORICA 7, 7 (1952). 
 62. See JERRY DUPONT, THE COMMON LAW ABROAD:  CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL 
LEGACY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE (2000). 
 63. Palmer (2009), supra note 29, at 344. 
 64. Given the treatment of the Maltese people both by the Grand Masters and 
subsequently the British, the cession may fit the “intercolonial transfer” Palmer finds in many of 
the members of the ‘third legal family’.  See Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 19-29. 
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matter.”65  The British started to administer Malta as if it had been 
conquered.  Indigenous representative institutions were dissolved.  
Maltese political and legal elites contested this account of the transition, 
claiming that it was the Maltese people that had reclaimed sovereignty 
over the islands in the uprising against the French and voluntarily ceded 
it to the British as part of an agreement which included an undertaking 
by the British government to respect Maltese autonomy and self-
governance.  They sought to use this claim in order to obtain a privileged 
status within the Empire, along with the preservation of the religion, laws 
and customs of the islands, thus combining considerable autonomy and 
self-government with the commercial advantages resulting from their 
association with Britain.  Broadly consistent with these arguments, the 
Maltese constitutional scholar J.J. Cremona has suggested that “[i]n the 
dawn of the nineteenth century the Maltese freely and voluntarily 
determined to place their Island home under the protection of Great 
Britain and to recognize the King of that country as their sovereign.”66  
The limited claim that there had been a voluntary cession by the Maltese 
people was also endorsed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in the well-known case of Sammut v Strickland.67  However the 
understanding that they were under a legal obligation to respect the 
islands’ autonomy was not accepted by the British Authorities.  
Preservation of the islands’ laws and norms did, however, intersect with 
the imperial policy of placating the Maltese to ensure their allegiance and 
avoid the practical disadvantages of change.68 
 The British ‘rationale’ for this cautious approach may be seen then 
to be “to preserve the structure of Maltese political and economic life to 
avoid the Maltese being required to make a sudden adjustment to an 
unfamiliar legal, political, administrative or social structure.”69  
Specifically in regard to law, the peculiarities of English law, not least the 
                                                 
 65. Cassar, supra note 60, at 150. 
 66. Cremona (1997), supra note 48, at 1; see PATRICK STAINES, ESSAYS ON GOVERNING 
MALTA (1800-1813) (2008); HARDING, supra note 53. 
 67. [1938] AC 768.  Cremona writes, supra note 48, at 1 n.1, that the Judicial Committee 
“acknowledged” this view.  It is important, however, both here and elsewhere, not to confuse 
judicial pronouncement with historical fact. 
 68. See H.I. Lee, British Policy Towards the Religion, Ancient Laws and Customs in 
Malta 1824-51—Part I:  Principles of Policy, and Appointment to Ecclesiastical Office, 3 MELITA 
HISTORICA 1, 1 (1963).  Indeed, this acquiescence was not unusual for the time.  A similar 
concession to French-speaking and catholic Quebec took place a half-century earlier.  See also 
Palmer’s discussion of mixed systems as “the product of compromise and mutual self-interest” in 
Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 18. 
 69. BARRY HOUGH & HOWARD DAVIS, COLERIDGE’S LAWS:  A STUDY OF COLERIDGE IN 
MALTA (2010), 66. 
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critical role played by its extensive jurisprudence, would have made it 
difficult, though not impossible, to immediately transplant the existing 
body of English law onto Maltese soil.  While the interaction between the 
British and the Maltese traditions seem to have resulted, in the words of 
Örücü, in a marriage of broadly “socio-culturally similar and legal-
culturally different legal systems”, the British also viewed the Maltese as 
very different from themselves.70  The British Commission of Inquiry 
sent in 1812, for example, advised caution on any alterations to the legal 
system since the Maltese “habits, customs, religion and education, are in 
direct opposition to our own.”71  Some Maltese laws were tolerated, in 
part at least, because English law was considered to be inappropriate for 
them.  As a result, Maltese private laws remained in force, in particular 
the Code de Rohan.  This indigenous—if not autochthonous—law was 
well-tested and familiar to the Maltese.  Moreover, the local legal 
profession strenuously objected to the imposition of British law.  More 
generally, given its roots in continental legal developments, the 
continuing importance of an Italian-speaking elite, and the limited 
Anglophone population in Malta, it is unsurprising that its existing 
tradition of private law was largely maintained.  Indeed, changes in 
private law can be difficult to accept.72  Especially in the nineteenth 
century, private law was more important to most people than public law.  
The former could be seen to be linked to the way of life, or at least the 
self-image, of a people.  It was a personal law that determined family 
law, property law, and the law of obligations (contracts and torts).  It was 
arguably part of an already complex Maltese identity.  It was also, 
initially at least, the monopoly of the local bar and judiciary.73  With some 
exceptions, e.g. maritime law, private law would remain significantly 
continental in substance.  Criminal and public law were not seen in the 
same terms and were, as a result, more easily altered.74  The contest of 
                                                 
 70. Örücü, A General View of ‘Legal Families’ and ‘Mixing Systems’, in COMPARATIVE 
LAW:  A HANDBOOK (Örücü & David Nelken eds., 2007), 180.  On the diffusion or 
“transmigration of laws”, see Örücü (2010), supra note 23, at 69-71. 
 71. Cassar, supra note 60, at 147. 
 72. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 21. 
 73. See Daniel Visser, Cultural Forces in the Making of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. 
REV. 41 (2003); Nir Kedar, Law, Culture and Civil Codification in a Mixed Legal System, 22 
CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y 177 (2007). 
 74. Note “the difficulties . . . encountered when jurists of different mentalities and 
accustomed to different systems of law try to combine their efforts to propose legislative chances 
acceptable to both.”  Ganado (1996), supra note 49, at 231. 
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legal and imperial elites was, in the context of coloniality in Malta, 
weighted in favor of the latter.75 
 Within the framework of this broadly cautious approach, it is 
possible to discern various shifts and changes in the British agenda for 
legal reform.  Under the autocratic, if often absent, rule of Sir Thomas 
‘King Tom’ Maitland (1813-24), various procedural reforms were 
introduced, including the reorganization of the courts and the 
establishment of judicial independence.  He introduced the principle of a 
public, viva voce and adversarial form of trial and the oral questioning of 
witnesses in open court.  A lay jury was introduced in some criminal 
trials.  Maitland seems, in fact, to have intended to completely replace the 
prevailing investigative procedures with those of English law.  This 
project lapsed on his death.  As will be discussed in further detail below, 
Maltese civil procedure did not become fully “adversarial along Anglo-
American lines.”76  In the 1830s, British policy shifted.  Local law was left 
intact in areas where the introduction of Anglo-British principles was not 
felt to be absolutely necessary.  This policy shift was reflected in the 
appointment in 1834 of a Commission composed exclusively of Maltese 
jurists in order to draft the five new law-codes:  the Civil Code, the Code 
of Organization and Civil Procedure, the Commercial Code, the Criminal 
Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedure.  The Commission was 
instructed to draft the codes in Italian.  They were to be modeled on the 
most accredited foreign continental codes.  The policy was also reflected 
in the dismissal, in 1839, of the English chief justice, Sir John Stoddart 
(1773-1856), who had agitated too aggressively in favor of the 
introduction of English and English criminal laws and procedures.  
Through this policy shift the colonial government hoped to avoid 
antagonizing the local legal profession.  The English language, too, only 
slowly and fitfully competed with Italian as the language of law and 
                                                 
 75. On the role of competing legal and social elites in the creation of legal complexity 
and in legal diffusion, see Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants:  A Dynamic Approach to Comparative 
Law (Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991), and Legal Formants:  A Dynamic 
Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343 (1991).  See also 
P.G. Monateri & Sacco, Legal Formants, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 76. Palmer (2009), supra note 29, at 343. 
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government.77  The result was a complex balance of living and legal 
languages.78 
 The creation of Maltese legal hybridity included a complicated and 
sometimes controversial process of codification.79  For example, in the 
period following the dismissal of Stoddart, two distinguished Maltese 
jurists, Judge Ignazio Bonavita and Dr Antonio Micallef, published three 
commentaries on Maltese procedural law and the law of proof and 
evidence.80  Written in Italian, these treat Maltese civil procedure as a 
seamless mixture of rules firmly rooted in Roman law and supplemented 
by Sicilian procedures, canon law, and Anglo-British law.  Bonavita 
referred to Anglo-British authorities, for example, when discussing the 
laws of proof and evidence.  He also insisted, however, that these rules 
must co-exist with other procedural rules, the proper interpretation of 
which requires an understanding of Romano-canonical law.  These 
commentaries provided a template for the Code of Organization and 
Civil Procedure subsequently drafted by Micallef and promulgated in 
1855.81  In fact, the enactment of codes only began at mid-century, during 
the heyday of British rule over Malta and over five decades after the 
French Code civil (1804).  The Criminal and Police Codes (1854) were 
the first to be promulgated.  The former “was modeled on the 
contemporary Italian and French Codes as far as substantive law is 
concerned, but incorporated the English and Scottish rules for purposes 
of criminal procedure.”82  These also followed a circuitous and 
                                                 
 77. See Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 41-44; Palmer (2006), supra note 29, at 470-71.  
Palmer also argues that English serves as the “international lingua franca” of mixed jurists.  Id. at 
470; cf. Roger K. Ward, The French Language in Louisiana Law and Legal Education:  A 
Requiem, 57 LA. L. REV. 1283 (1997). 
 78. “In no place of equally circumscribed extent is the confluence of strangers greater 
than at Malta.”  Malta and the Maltese.—No. I., in 462 THE PENNY MAGAZINE OF THE SOCIETY 
FOR THE DIFFUSION OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE (1839), 229.  This essay is the first of four curious 
pieces on Malta in this curious magazine. 
 79. H.I. Lee, British Policy Towards the Religion, Ancient Laws and Customs in Malta 
1824-51—Part II:  The Revision of the Codes of Law, 4 MELITA HISTORICA 1 (1964). 
 80. These include ANTONIO MICALLEF, TRATTATO DELLE PROCEDURE CIVILI NEL FORO DI 
MALTA (1839); IGNAZIO BONAVITA, RACCOLTA DELLE LEGGI DI PROCEDURA DELLE CORTI 
SUPERIORI ORDINARIE DI MALTA PUBBLICATE DAL 1814 AL 1840 COME SONO ATTUALMENTE IN 
VIGORE (1841); and SAGGIO SULLA PROVA GIUDIZIARIA CONSIDERATA IN RAPPORTO ALL’ATTUALE 
LEGISLAZIONE MALTESE (1844). 
 81. Judge Paolo De Bono wrote that the form of the trial mainly follows canon law 
whereas common law rules determine matters of proof and evidence.  De Bono (1897), supra 
note 53, at 322. 
 82. Nancy C. Grosselfinger, Malta, prepared for the World Factbook of Criminal Justice 
Systems, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ascii/WFBCJMAL.TXT (last visited 10 Mar. 2011)). 
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contentious path.83  After the codes of Organization and Civil Procedure, 
a Commercial Code was enacted in 1857.  Most importantly, the Maltese 
Civil Code was promulgated—in an unusual piecemeal fashion—from 
1868 to 1874.  Only in 1942 did it “come into existence as one entity.”84  
This code was redacted by the Maltese jurist Adriano Dingli (later ‘Sir’ 
Adriano Dingli).  Through his work, the Code both reflected past Maltese 
law, especially the Code de Rohan, and showed borrowing from other 
contemporary codes.85  The French Code civil was especially important.  
Various Italian codes, as well as those of Austria and Louisiana, were 
also consulted.86  Each of these codes combined in different ways the 
inheritance of the ius commune and local legal developments, not least 
those rooted in European folk-laws. 
 Not surprisingly, the imperial authorities oriented public law and 
colonial institutions towards an Anglo-British model.  There is some 
small irony, common to other mixed systems, in the effective adoption of 
a private/public law division of continental (Roman) provenance.  And if 
British public law was justly seen as progressive by contemporary 
standards, the Maltese often experienced only the rhetoric of Anglo-
British exceptionalism rather than receiving tangible benefits in practice.  
As Governor, Maitland delivered a moving address in 1815, singing the 
praises of British constitutionalism, the ‘rule of law’ and the ‘separation 
of powers’.  Then, “[a]fter this memorable speech the Governor 
proceeded to concentrate the three powers of the State upon himself ”.87  
This was not limited to Maitland.  Over the course of a century and a half 
of imperial rule, British policy appears schizophrenic.  As Cremona 
writes: 
                                                 
 83. See Douglas Gourlay, Andrew Jameson and the Origins of the Criminal Code of 
Malta, 15 MELITA HISTORICA 109 (2009); Jean Paul Grech, Malta, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA (2006, available at www.heuni.fi/uploads/2rg2e.pdf (last visited 
10 Mar. 2011)), 8-14. 
 84. Bonello, The Maltese Civil Code:  A Brief Historical Introduction, in HISTORIES OF 
MALTA:  REFLECTIONS AND REJECTIONS—VOLUME FIVE (Bonello ed., 2004), 194.  The two 
ordinances covered the whole field of private law except (i) citizenship and intellectual property 
rights which were governed by English law and (ii) marriage governed by canon law.  The 
original text of the modern Code was promulgated in Italian, but later translated into English and 
Maltese.  “[T]he English text prevails for the bulk of the Code (enacted before 1964) while the 
Maltese text should be the authoritative one for amendments made after Independence.”  Id. at 
195-96. 
 85. See Arturo Mercieca, Sir Adriano Dingli [Part I]:  sommo statista, legislatore, 
magistrato, 3 MELITA HISTORICA 164 (1954); Sir Adriano Dingli [Part II]:  sommo statista, 
legislatore, magistrato, 1 MELITA HISTORICA 221 (1955); see also Joseph M. Ganado & Joseph A. 
Micallef, Sir Adrian Dingli, 1 THE LAW JOURNAL 9 (1945). 
 86. Dingli note his sources “in painstaking manuscript explanatory notes”.  Bonello 
(2004), supra note 84, at 194. 
 87. Ganado (1950), supra note 2, at 199. 
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The vicissitudes of the constitutional development of Malta from that time 
is remarkable. . . .  “It would be almost possible,” wrote the Royal 
Commissioners of 1931, “to plot the graph of the constitutional history of 
Malta during the last hundred years showing the rise and fall of 
constitutions modelled alternatively on the principle of benevolent 
autocracy and that of representative government.”  If such a graph were to 
be plotted, it would have to start at the lower point in the chart, with 
gubernatorial autocracy.  Indeed until 1835 all power, executive and 
legislative, was concentrated solely on the hands of the head of the 
Government, whose enactments took the form of Proclamations and 
Notifications or Bandi.88 
In the century and a half before Maltese independence, the Maltese had 
eleven constitutions (1813, 1835, 1849, 1887, 1903, 1921, 1936, 1939, 
1947, 1959, 1961).  British rule was, in fact, complex and often 
contested.  In a sense, the British powers were continuous with the 
powers of the Knights before them.  The safeguards of the British 
constitution were ignored.  The ‘rule of law’ was often violated.  There 
was no meaningful ‘separation of powers’.  There was also, for decades, 
no freedom of the press.  Malta was “viewed as an island fortress and too 
much liberty was considered potentially dangerous.”89  Even so, the 
defense of continental legal links was such that there was less influence 
from Anglo-American judicial institutions than in other modern mixed 
systems.  And, if Maltese judges had “creative mindsets”, this may not 
have been an import.90  It might instead have represented a long-standing 
Maltese tradition of judicial authority.  It might also reflect the power of 
continental judges under the ius commune, a power only slowly altered 
outside of France.91  In addition, while a process of legal anglicization did 
occur, especially in public law, it was less the result of “judicial 
                                                 
 88. Cremona (1997), supra note 48, at 1. 
 89. Ganado (1996), supra note 49, at 229. 
 90. Palmer (2009), supra note 29, at 343. 
 91. This is consistent, for example, with the work of Gino Gorla.  He argued that what 
‘appears to be unique in the English legal system . . . was during the sixteenth and eighteenth 
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interpretation” than of imperial will and legislative change.92  In sum, this 
period marks the ‘founding’ of the mixed system (in its modern usage).93  
British laws and legal institutions steadily became more influential.  In 
general, however, Malta’s experience “illustrat[ed] two things:  firstly, the 
great difficulty of making a nation change its own private law;  secondly, 
the possibility of having a perfectly compatible public law system of 
foreign origin.”94 
C. Subsequent Developments 
 These Maltese changes took place against a background of 
significant political and legal revolutions across the West.95  Over the 
course of the nineteenth century, the plurality of laws that had 
characterized Europe for centuries was largely eliminated.  The focus on 
legal positivism, on law-making and legal clarity, was linked to both the 
new powers of the state and demands for popular accountability.  While 
the process was not uniform, in continental law, this was expressed in 
legislation, often codal, and subsequently in exegetical interpretation.96  
Many nineteenth-century codes were attempts to create a set of laws that 
was authoritative, comprehensive, systematic, and internally harmonious.  
They were intended to abrogate previous or conflicting law and to unify 
the legal system into a national common law.  While reflecting the laws 
of the ancien régime, both Roman and Germanic in origin, this 
movement was exemplified in the Code civil (1804).97  Modern 
nationalism and codification marked an important change from Europe’s 
earlier plural, juridical culture.  It was a shift from European iura 
communia and local iura propria to national law, from persuasive to 
binding authorities, from open to closed legal systems, and from judges 
and jurists to legislators.98  The British equivalent, exemplified by the 
                                                 
 92. Palmer (2009), supra note 29, at 343. 
 93. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 17; cf. Palmer (2006), supra note 29, at 468-69. 
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legal philosophies of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, was linked to 
British parliamentary supremacy and the rise of statute law.99  It can also 
be seen in the hardening of precedent into stare decisis, where a single 
judicial decision is binding, rather than merely persuasive, on the basis of 
the court’s authority alone.100  Legal education and law reporting 
improved, often with official reporters.  A clearer appellate hierarchy of 
courts was established with, by mid-century, professional law lords at 
their head.  The writ system was relaxed in favor of general pleading, 
bringing a new focus on substantive, rather than procedural, law.  Finally, 
common law and equity were fused; England’s multifarious jurisdictions 
were enveloped by the courts of common law.101  If this did not entirely 
eliminate, in fact, either legal or normative hybridity, “[b]y the end of the 
nineteenth century law can hardly be thought of except in its formal or 
professional sense.”102 
 In fact, changes in Maltese law were consistent with what Patrick 
Glenn refers to as a shift from an “unstructured” to a “structured” 
mixité.103  This more clearly compartmentalized hybridity maintained 
some legal diversity, but created a ‘system’ in Malta “composed of a 
number of clearly distinguished compartments.”104  In this form, the 
Maltese legal tradition achieved a certain consistency into the twentieth 
century.  Stability was, however, often missing in Maltese politics.105  In 
the early twentieth century, for example, a letter was written by the 
elected members of the Council for Government to Alfred Lyttelton 
(1857-1913), MP and Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated: 
Sir, you must be well aware that the present constitution is looked upon by 
the intelligent and independent class of these Islands as one of the 
narrowest and most oppressive oligarchies that ever mocked the form of 
free Government.  Why, then, refuse to take any action concerning these 
                                                 
 99. Note that a British Commission of Inquiry in 1836 included Austin. 
 100. Jim Evans, Change in the Doctrine of Precedent During the Nineteenth Century, in 
PRECEDENT IN LAW (Laurence Goldstein, ed.,1991); Stein, Civil Law Reports and the Case of San 
Marino, in Stein (2003), supra note 98. 
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the Common Law, in ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN LAW AND ISRAEL (Alfredo Mordechai Rabello ed., 
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Islands, in accordance with the sound constitutional principles that should 
govern a Crown Colony as laid down by you.106 
In the aftermath of the Great War, and in the context of European 
revolutions and extremism, threats to British rule in Ireland, and the high 
cost of living and inadequate food supply, civil unrest increased in Malta.  
So did pressure for greater autonomy.107  The post-war National Assembly 
pressed for self-rule.  More significantly, in the midst of riots on 7 June 
1919, British soldiers fired into Maltese crowds, killing four.  The event 
radicalized the Maltese and ‘Sette Giugno’—Italian for the seventh of 
June—remains a national holiday.  A subsequent diarchic British 
constitution for Malta, that of 30 April 1921, gave the Maltese control of 
internal affairs while retaining British control over external matters.  The 
complex issue of language also acquired new vitality in this period.  The 
attempts to introduce English as the primary language of education, 
starting from the later nineteenth century onwards, generated the so-
called ‘language question’ or conflict between the upholders of Italian as 
the language of culture, law and education in Malta and the proponents 
of English.  The origins of the language question can be traced to the 
controversy in the early nineteenth century regarding the language to be 
used in the law codes and the Maltese legal profession long provided the 
backbone of the pro-Italian ‘Nationalist’ political resistance to 
anglicisation.  Italian was long dominant, though English became 
increasingly important from the 1870s given its promotion by the 
colonial authorities and its use in education.  With Italian, it was 
recognized as an official language in the Constitution of 1921.  The 
Maltese language was slowly introduced in legal proceedings in 1929, 
but only acknowledged as an official language in 1934.108  In 1936, it 
became the official language of the courts.  Italian remained an official 
language until 1939; the following year marked the beginning of the 
Italo-German ‘Siege of Malta’ (11 June 1940-20 November 1942). 
 The Axis assaults marked an important turning-point in Maltese 
politics.  Prior to the war, the British had moved much of their fleet to 
Alexandria in the 1930s.  The war made Malta’s position vital to the 
British, their allies, and their enemies.  The bravery of the Maltese in 
enduring the siege, enabled by considerable British effort, led to the 
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collective award of the ‘George Cross’ from Britain’s King George to the 
Maltese people on 15 April 1942.109  Italian attacks also had the effect, at 
least for the larger part of the population, of undermining long-standing 
Italian political sympathies.  However, 
[i]n expectation of attack scores of staunch Nationalist supporters . . . . 
were arrested and interned on suspicion of disloyalty as a precautionary 
measure.  When the attack finally came, on 11 June 1940, the Governor put 
into operation the instruction sent to him from London a week before.  
Civil servants suspected of disloyalty to the Crown were arrested and 
interned, the most prominent of these being the Chief Justice, Sir Arturo 
Mercieca.  Eventually those arrested . . . were later deported to Uganda 
without trial or charge, under special emergency powers, until the end of 
the war.110 
While these illegal actions must be understood in their historical 
context—compare, for example, the American internment of Japanese-
Americans—it hardly inspired confidence in the British ‘rule of law’.111  
The post-war years were a period of political and economic uncertainty.  
In the 1950s, many Maltese, on the proposal of their Labour Party, even 
appeared ready to accept the integration of the island into the United 
Kingdom.  This proposal ultimately failed and the Maltese Legislative 
Assembly unanimously passed a resolution to break with Britain.  Malta 
eventually received independence on 21 September 1964 with the British 
Queen remaining, formally at least, as head of state.112  A decade later, on 
13 December 1974, Malta was declared a republic, becoming fully 
                                                 
 109. The George Cross now appears on the Maltese flag. 
 110. Cassar, supra note 60, at 212-13. 
 111. Indeed: 
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autonomous but a member of the Commonwealth of Nations.113  
Following the end of the British military presence in 1979, the Maltese 
government sought to remain non-aligned in the ‘Cold War’.  While this 
led to some curious friendships, not least with the Chinese, Malta was the 
site of the first meeting between the American President George H.W. 
Bush and the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989.  Following a 
referendum in 2003, Malta became a member of the E.U. in 2004 and 
joined the Eurozone in 2008. 
IV. THE PRESENT 
A. The Sources of Law 
 In his Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide (2001), Palmer argued that 
within mixed jurisdictions there exist divisions between ‘purists’ 
determined to defend the continental legal traditions, ‘pollutionists’ eager 
to incorporate additional Anglo-American law, and ‘pragmatists’ who 
deal with the law before them practically, often generating new legal 
creations or hybrids in the process.  This division is reflected, too, in 
Maltese law.  These “orientations” have been and remain “closely tied to 
national descent, maternal tongue, and legal education.”114  It is related to 
both ethnic-linguistic divisions of the past and present loyalties 
towards—and familiarity with—the specific area of law on which 
Maltese jurists work.  Broadly speaking, Maltese private lawyers are 
more likely to be purists; public lawyers are more likely to be, in this 
terminology, pollutionists.  In general, however, the contemporary 
Maltese legal mind is generally recognized as pragmatic.  As Joseph 
Ganado concludes in his overview of Maltese law: 
To avoid confusing legal principles deriving from different sources, it is 
natural that caution is to be exercised.  I would say that it is necessary to 
view the system as composed of a number of clearly distinguished 
compartments.  The approach was a pragmatic, rather than a theoretical 
one, and, therefore, the combination cannot be described as being on a 
doctrinal basis.115 
                                                 
 113. For an interesting analysis of legality in former British colonies and its link to 
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We agree with Palmer, too, that the legal choices made between 
borrowed traditions in these mixed systems are not merely exercises in 
logic, but clashes of legal culture.116  They frequently reflect bias and 
ignorance rather than reason.  This may be true of other, nominally 
‘pure’, jurisdictions as well, but has more significance in mixed systems 
where the “fantasies” of judges “are more than idle dreams.  The uses 
and abuses of comparative law that they engage in are . . . a significant 
part of legal development.”117  Indeed, in addition to combining 
continental private law with Anglo-American public and criminal law, 
Palmer notes that in each of these jurisdictions he studied Anglo-
American law penetrates, to varying degrees, both (i) judicial institutions 
and procedures and (ii) substantive (private and commercial) law.118  The 
former is significant; the latter varies in a reasonably common “pattern of 
penetration and resistance”.119  This Part of the Article will suggest how 
Maltese’s unique legal system meets these criteria. 
 As a consequence of its complex past, the modern sources of law in 
Malta are varied.120  They are also not very clearly laid out.121  In addition 
to European laws (those of the E.U. and the E.C.H.R.), Maltese enacted 
law consists of several hundred ‘chapters’ arranged chronologically.  The 
Constitution was originally passed and promulgated by the British 
Parliament.  It is now entrenched, requiring a two-thirds majority of the 
Maltese Parliament to amend it.  The Constitution is quite long and 
reflects the precision and detail of English statutory drafting.  British 
public law is a subsidiary source in public law matters.  As in continental 
jurisdictions, however, Malta’s written law includes ‘true’ continental 
codes (in contrast to mere restatements of law) as well as narrower, 
special legislation.122  Custom remains a binding source of law, but its 
                                                 
 116. “Unsurprisingly, the mixed jurisdictions become intellectual battlegrounds where 
passions, prejudices and considerable learning occasionally took to the barricades.”  Palmer 
(2001), supra note 10, at 31. 
 117. Id. at 57. 
 118. Indeed, his inclusion of public law was an important shift from the traditional narrow 
focus on comparative law on private law.  Palmer (2001), id. at 6 n.8; see also Örücü, Public Law 
in Mixed Legal Systems and Public Law as a ‘Mixed System’, 5 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2001, 
available at www.ejcl.org/52/abs52-2.html (last visited 10 Mar. 2011)). 
 119. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 57; see id. at 53-59; Palmer (2006), supra note 29, at 
471-72; see also José Trias Monge, Legal Methodology in some Mixed Jurisdictions, 78 TUL. L. 
REV. 333 (2003). 
 120. Busuttil, supra note 46, at M-47. 
 121. This is true, of course, of most jurisdictions. Stefan Vogenauer, Sources of Law and 
Legal Method in Comparative Law, in Reimann & Zimmermann, supra note 5, at 869-98. 
 122. The latter have proliferated and arguably tend to undermine the centrality of the 
codes.  For the distinction between ‘true’ or ‘substantive’ codes and other, ‘formal’ codifications, 
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role is limited in practice.  Even Roman law may be relevant.  Most 
importantly for our purposes, Maltese jurisprudence appears to follow a 
continental pattern.  Judicial decisions are not formally binding, though 
their “persuasive weight steadily increases as the courts progressively 
establish a uniform course of decisions, a jurisprudence constante, on a 
particular point.”123  Of course, Anglo-American stare decisis is rarely 
pure.  There are significant differences between, for example, the 
contemporary American and British systems.124  Similarly, continental 
legal ideology to the contrary, jurisprudence constante, a consistent 
pattern of legal interpretation by the courts, often works in practice in 
much the same manner.125  There has arguably been considerable 
convergence over the last few decades.126  In the ‘third legal family’, 
however, the question of the status of precedent are often seen as very 
important, “rai[sing] a defining issue in the quest for the ‘soul’ of the 
system”, i.e. is it predominantly Anglo-American or continental in 
orientation.127  While there are some elements associated with Anglo-
American judicial methods—for instance the ratio decidendi/obiter 
dictum distinction is sometimes invoked—the Maltese judiciary adheres 
more generally to a European model.128  Only collegial opinions are 
expressed.  Individual judges are not identified and dissents are not 
issued.129  In practice, then, it may be true that Maltese “court decisions 
                                                                                                                  
see Jean-Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073 
(1988). 
 123. Busuttil, supra note 46, at M-47.  “[W]hatever a judge may say, can always be 
described as an obiter . . . .  The ratio decidendi does not figure as a different concept.”  Ganado 
(1950), supra note 2, at 206.  On ‘jurisprudence constante’, see James L. Dennis, Interpretation 
and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1 
(1993).  Note, too, the irony that Anglo-American stare decisis can maintain continental ‘purity’ 
by making the civilian elements difficult to change. 
 124. See Atiyah & Summers, supra note 9, especially at 118-27. 
 125. See, e.g., Stein (2003), supra note 100, at 241; see also Neil MacCormick & Robert 
S. Summers eds., INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1997). 
 126. Mary Ann Glendon, The Sources of Law in a Changing Legal Order, 17 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 663, 665-66 (1984). 
 127. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 45; see id. at 44-46; Palmer (2006), supra note 29, at 
471. 
 128. Maltese courts often distinguish between the ‘parti dispozittiva’ (the dispositive part) 
of a judgment, which contains the decision and is considered to have most authority and the 
reasoning which led to it.  The terms ‘ratio decidendi’ and ‘obiter dictum’ are also sometimes 
used.  Whether referred to as the ‘parti dispozittiva’ or ‘ratio decidendi’ however, the principle still 
lacks, in a strict sense, binding force.  Cf. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 49. 
 129. A deeper layer of Maltese ‘common law’ may also exist, though its content is unclear.  
In an important case in Malta, that of Sammut v Strickland, (138) A.C. 678, Lord Strickland 
stated that ‘[t]he Roman law is no doubt our common law.’  Cited in Ganado (1950), supra note 2, 
at 204.  This seems to mean that outside of the written or enact legislation that Roman law, or, 
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. . . are accorded more precedential value than in traditional civilian 
jurisdictions”, though they are not “accepted as an official source of 
law”.130  This fact may also owe something to the virtual absence of 
indigenous ‘doctrine’ (legal scholarship) in Malta. 
 As elsewhere, doctrine is not, strictly speaking, binding in Malta, 
but is “treated by the judges with considerable respect.”131  If this appears 
to reflect a continental alignment, the paucity of modern Maltese 
doctrine means that the vital role of developing Maltese law is often 
played by its judiciary, notwithstanding the absence of binding 
precedent.132  This is arguably linked to both Maltese legal education and 
a certain level of legal pragmatism.  The jurisdiction’s sole law faculty is 
based in the University of Malta.  The language of instruction there is 
English rather than Maltese.  The law faculty consists largely of part-time 
lecturers simultaneously engaged in legal practice; there are only a dozen 
full-time lecturers.  This focus reflects and/or contributes to pragmatism, 
but it also arguably inhibits legal theory in the jurisdiction.  Legal 
education combines the reading of (i) the lecture notes of leading (past) 
jurists and (ii) foreign texts, often British, that were not written 
specifically for the jurisdiction.  The notes remain unpublished, to be 
collected by students from the University library.  They are often many 
decades old and effectively function as glosses on the written law.133  As 
noted, there are very few native texts.  Largely parallel to continental 
legal education, law students complete an undergraduate in law (LLB) 
followed by a graduate degree (LLD) required for legal practice.134  This 
differs from both (i) the British and Irish combination of university 
followed by professional study and (ii) the three-year graduate study of 
law in North American law schools.  LLD students usually apprentice 
with practitioners during the latter stages of their study.  Students train as 
general practitioners or ‘advocates’.  There is neither an English-style 
distinction between barristers and solicitors nor continental-style training 
for a judicial career.  There are also, however, ‘legal procurators’, who 
assist advocates and have some rights of audience in the lower courts, 
and notaries who, on the continental model, remain important in legal 
                                                                                                                  
more accurately perhaps, the tradition of the ius commune, could continue to exist as a resource 
for background principles.  This is, however, a complex question. 
 130. Palmer (2009), supra note 29, at 343. 
 131. Busuttil, supra note 46, at M-47. 
 132. Doctrine in the sense of legal scholarship is also, however, significant in American 
law and, especially over the last few decades, increasingly important in British law. 
 133. See, e.g., Mifsud Bonnici, supra note 1, at 41-42. 
 134. This is currently being harmonized in line the Bologna Process of the E.U.  Having 
completed their LLD studies, Maltese advocates are commonly addressed as ‘Doctor’. 
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practice.  Receiving the LLD requires a lengthy academic dissertation 
(35,000 words) by the students.  Stored at the Law Faculty, these make up 
a considerable body of native scholarship.135  A student-edited journal (Id-
Dritt) also exists, but its publication has sometimes been sporadic and it 
is aimed at a largely local audience.136  The ‘Chamber of Advocates’ also 
publishes a short publication entitled Law & Practice (formerly De Jure).  
The Chamber is the elected body which represents Maltese lawyers as a 
whole, particularly in relations with the Government and regulatory 
bodies.  Since it was set up in 1877 it has played an important role in 
professional self-regulation, ethics and development.137 
 As in a number of other mixed systems, the judiciary may properly 
be seen as “the real authorities of the civilian law.”138  In Malta, this is 
rooted in long practice, as well as institutional factors like the security of 
tenure of the judiciary.139  The Maltese judiciary is made up of 
‘magistrates’ who sit in the inferior courts and ‘judges’ who sit in the 
superior courts.  While the qualifications for each differ slightly, both 
will be referred to here as ‘judges’.140  As noted, Maltese is the language 
of the courts.  English is an official and important language, but where 
there is conflict between Maltese and English texts, the Maltese usually 
prevails.  In general, Maltese judges look in some respects like those in 
                                                 
 135. These dissertations may prove invaluable to foreign scholars.  Since 2010, the theses 
have begun to be digitized by the University of Malta’s Library, making it possible to search 
theses by free text.  Unfortunately, these remain inaccessible online.  A list of titles available in the 
Law Library of the Law Faculty is available at www.ghsl.org/content/view/19/37/ (last visited 4 
Apr. 2011). 
 136. The journal began publication in 1944 as the quarterly Malta Law Journal.  Another 
student journal, the E.L.S.A. Malta Law Review, was launched last year (see http://www.elsamalta 
lawreview.com/ (last visited 2 May 2012)). 
 137. See Chamber of Advocates, www.avukati.org/chamberofadvocates/home.aspx (last 
visited 8 Mar. 2011). 
 138. Kenny D. Anthony, The Viability of the Civilist Tradition in St. Lucia:  A Tentative 
Appraisal, in ESSAYS OF THE CIVIL CODES OF QUÉBEC AND ST. LUCIA (Raymond A. Landry & 
Ernest Caparros eds., 1984), 61.  Quoting Jean-Gabriel Catel on Quebec, he adds, ‘“Their 
judgments are considered as doctrinal essays of great persuasion in subsequent cases.  They, and 
not the commentators and law professors (as in France), are the heroes of the Québec civil law.”’  
Id. (citing CASTEL, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC (1962), 232).  Cf. the 
more complex role of judicial ‘navigation’ in Turkey’s more complex mixed system in Örücü, 
‘Judicial navigation as official law meets culture in Turkey’, in Örücü (2010), supra note 23, 
especially 179-80.  Note that the dominance of judges may change as the Law Faculty of the 
University of Malta employs more full-time law professors. 
 139. See the discussion of the English, French, German, Spanish, and Swedish judiciaries 
in JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES WITHIN EUROPE:  A COMPARATIVE REVIEW (2006). 
 140. A Judicial Studies Committee is responsible for training of both and both are assisted 
by a ‘Judiciary team’ or staff.  See generally the Judiciary Malta Site, http://www.judiciarymalta. 
gov.mt/home (last visited 31 Mar. 2011).  The European Justice site is also useful; see https://e-
justice.europa.eu/home.do?lang=en&action=home (last visited 6 Apr. 2011). 
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Anglo-American jurisdictions or indeed like those of the ‘third legal 
family’.  They tend to be drawn from senior practitioners rather than 
following the continental division, educational and professional, between 
magistrate and lawyer.  Reflecting their Anglo-American inheritance, 
judges in the jurisdictions Palmer studies see themselves as possessing 
inherent, rather than delegated, powers.141  They may see themselves, as in 
Louisiana’s ‘mixed jurisdiction’, “as being law-creators as well as law 
appliers.”142  This is arguably true of Maltese judges and adjudication.  
Their opinions, too, at least since 1945, generally resemble more the 
discursive pattern of the common law than the more abbreviated form 
associated with the Franco-Romano (rather than Germanic) continental 
tradition.  As Palmer noted for the ‘third legal family’, Maltese codal and 
statutory interpretation can follow continental and Anglo-American 
approaches respectively.143  That is, in codal interpretation, the broadly-
phrased articles suggest a liberal, teleological or purposive, approach.  
Where there are lacunae in the code, the judge can deductively analogize 
through its implicit principles in much the same way that a common 
lawyer might analogize inductively between cases.  Judges find the law 
not in, but through, the codes.  With detailed ‘special’ statutes or 
common law-style legislation, judges will adopt a narrower, more literal 
approach.144  Finally, in Malta, “constant reference is made by Maltese 
judges to parliamentary debates, and what is said in Parliament in regard 
to the interpretation of laws is given considerable weight.”145  This is 
consistent with both continental and American practice.  It is very 
different, however, from the so-called ‘exclusionary rule’ that prohibits 
the use of parliamentary history in Britain or Ireland.146 
B. Civil and Criminal Procedure 
 All Western legal traditions have adversarial elements, especially 
with regard to the requirement that parties to a dispute have a fair and 
reasonable opportunity to present their case.  In modern parlance, 
however, Anglo-American procedures are generally referred to as 
‘adversarial’ while continental procedures are labeled ‘investigative’ or 
                                                 
 141. Cf. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 35-40; Palmer (2006), supra note 29, at 469-70. 
 142. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 269. 
 143. In practice, this may be little different from the continental approach to codal 
interpretation, on one hand, and the interpretation of special statutes on the other. 
 144. See generally Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., INTERPRETING 
STATUTES:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1991). 
 145. Ganado (1950), supra note 2, at 201-02. 
 146. See Donlan & Rónán Kennedy, “A Flood of Light?”:  Comments on the 
Interpretation Act 2005, 6 JUD’L STUD. INSTITUTE J. 92, especially 99-104 (2006). 
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‘inquisitorial’.  These are probably better seen as ‘party-centered’ and 
‘judge-centered’ respectively.  But such terms, like many in comparative 
law, serve only as a rough and simplified shorthand, a kind of ideal type, 
for the substantive and institutional complexity of legal systems.  They 
also generally focus on the most formal legal procedures and ignore 
minor matters and summary trials.  In general, Anglo-American 
procedures are characterized by the antagonism of active parties (or 
counsel) before a largely passive judge and, in some instances, a lay jury.  
Because of the historical role of the jury, trials are continuous, orality is 
emphasized, and an elaborate body of laws relating to the admissibility of 
evidence is employed.  Finally, experts on subjects relevant to a particular 
case are chosen by the parties and reflect their interests and arguments.  
In contrast, continental procedures are marked by a more central role for 
judges and the absence of a jury.  The result is that ‘trials’ need not be 
continuous and may focus to a much greater extent on written 
documentation rather than oral argument.  Simple guidelines on evidence 
suffice for the professional judges involved.  Experts in investigative 
systems are also frequently court-appointed.147  But these generalizations 
mask considerable complexity in practice.  For example, unlike the 
situation in the United States, where civil juries are reasonably common, 
the civil jury largely disappeared from British and Irish law over a 
century ago.  Anglo-American judiciaries have also recently taken on 
greater responsibilities for case management than was true in the past.148  
And some continental jurisdictions, most notably Germany, employ lay 
judges, usually specialists in a specific area elected for a term of office 
(in commercial, family, and employment courts) rather than for a single 
legal dispute.  So a distinction between ‘party-centered’ and ‘judge-
centered’ procedures remains meaningful, but complicated. 
 Within the jurisdictions of the ‘third legal family’, continental legal 
procedures were quickly replaced by those of Anglo-American origin.149  
In Louisiana, for example, this has been described as the “suffocation” of 
                                                 
 147. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 62-66; Palmer (2006), supra note 29, at 473-74; see 
Chapter 8 of Ugo A. Mattei, Teemu Ruskola, & Antonio Gidi eds., SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE 
LAW ((7th ed.) 2009); see also John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) at 835-41. 
 148. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Composing a Judiciary:  Reflections on Proposed Reforms 
in the United Kingdom on How To Change the Voices of and the Constituencies for Judging, 24 
LEGAL STUD. 228 (2004). 
 149. Palmer adds that ‘one can observe differences between those countries with 
procedural systems which were once civilian and have been thoroughly anglicized [South Africa, 
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines], those only partly anglicized [Quebec and Louisiana], and those 
which have never known civil law procedure in the first place [Scotland and Israel].’  Palmer 
(2006), supra note 29, at 473. 
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their French and Spanish procedural roots.150  More generally, it has been 
explained by “the emotional, almost religious attachment of the 
adherents of . . . common law procedure to their system.”151  This 
movement towards Anglo-American procedures is an important 
development in the ‘third legal family’.  Its impact is not limited to 
procedural law.  As Palmer notes, Anglo-American procedures can 
actually “leave a visible imprint upon the civil law. . . .  [S]ubstantive law 
may be subtly modified, without further judicial or legislative will, at the 
practical stage of law realization.”152  In Malta, while there is considerable 
judicial discretion and flexibility in practice, the form of trial in civil 
matters remains significantly more judge-centered than in either the 
‘classical mixed jurisdictions’ or Anglo-American law.153  This is clear in 
the rules of the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure, most of which 
have continental origins.154  It is also obvious in the episodic practice of 
ordinary civil trials.155  During a single sitting a witness may be examined 
or a document presented.  There is little of the courtroom drama or 
histrionics associated with Anglo-American—or, more accurately 
perhaps, American—law.  In Malta, the parties tend to focus on the 
written case file or dossier rather than on the oral hearing.  There is no 
Anglo-American discovery system.  There is no jury.  The rules of 
                                                 
 150. Kent A. Lambert, The Suffocation of a Legal Heritage:  A Comparative Analysis of 
Civil Procedure in Louisiana and France—The Corruption of Louisiana’s Civilian Tradition, 67 
TUL. L. REV. 231 (1992). 
 151. Stephen Goldstein, The Odd Couple:  Common Law Procedure and Civilian 
Substantive Law, 78 TUL. L. REV. 291, 293 (2003). 
 152. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 63.  “The old maxim that civil law subordinates the 
remedy to the right is thus turned on its head in jurisdictions where common-law procedure 
controls the right.”  Id. at 66.  Note the idea that “civil law can be seen as “a jewel in a brooch . . . 
[which] glitters in a setting that was made in England.”  Reid, supra note 38, at 21 (quoting H.R. 
HAHLO & ELISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS BACKGROUND (1991), 
585). 
 153. Zammit, Examining Our Assumptions When Developing Clinics Abroad:  Some 
Reflections Based on the Maltese Experience (unpublished paper presented to the American 
Association of Law Schools (AALS) Workshop on Clinical Legal Education (New Orleans, 2-6 
May 2007), especially 4-5); see also Zammit, Professional Ideals in Maltese Legal Practice, 18 
ID-DRITT 165 (2002). 
 154. Various amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure and the civil trial were made in 
the twentieth century.  In particular, one should note the amendments made by Ordinance XV of 
1913, following the report of the Mowatt Commission, which allowed the plaintiff and the 
defendant to give testimony in their own cases.  See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE 
FINANCES, ECONOMIC POSITION, AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE OF MALTA (1912). 
 155. In fact, numerous adjournments and deferrals of the hearing are usually given and it is 
normal for such a civil trial to take years to be concluded.  Government statistics for 2010 show 
that 39% of the cases pending before the Civil Court (First Hall) have been pending for more than 
4 years (see Published Age Analysis, available at http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/courtservices/ 
Statistics/civil.aspx?year=2010 (last visited 10 Mar. 2011). 
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evidence are little utilized and largely unnecessary given the jury’s 
absence.  In addition, judges often assume an active role in the overall 
direction of proceedings.  Moreover, as the same judge decides both legal 
and factual aspects of a case, lawyers tend to be conservative in their 
objections to the use of testimony and any judicial examination of 
witnesses.  To access technical evidence, Maltese courts also tend to rely 
on written reports produced by court-appointed experts, though parties 
may also appoint ex parte expert witnesses.156  None of this should 
obscure the fact that Malta has adversarial elements in its procedures.  
The requirement that parties fairly and reasonably present their cases is a 
legacy of its legal tradition, both of its parent traditions, and, more 
recently, of the E.C.H.R. 
 Maltese criminal trials are more party-centered, though even here 
there are continental influences.  Maltese criminal law has been 
described as “eclectic”.157  The Criminal Court in Malta typically uses a 
jury.  While even modern continental traditions use juries, the Maltese 
institution is recognized as an instance of Anglo-American borrowing.  
Indeed, the criminal jury “merged so completely into the Maltese legal 
system that is has long been regarded as an essential and living part of 
it.”158  Its use has meant that, unlike in civil matters, the principle of a 
single continuous hearing was adhered to in criminal trials given the 
impracticality of dissolving a jury once summoned to postpone the 
continuance of the hearing to another date.  Continental elements are 
present, too.  For example, an inquiring magistrate exists to gather 
evidence in the pre-trial phase of criminal trials, at least in the case of 
offences whose punishment exceeds a ten-year term of imprisonment.159  
The magistrate presides over a Court of Criminal Inquiry with wide-
ranging powers to summon and question witnesses.160  This court does 
                                                 
 156. There is a rule prohibiting witnesses from being questioned in the presence of other 
witnesses in the same case.  Act XXIV of 1995 also introduced far reaching changes to the civil 
trial, particularly the introduction of a pre-trial hearing aimed at clarifying the facts in dispute and 
more widespread use of affidavits for purposes of presenting testimony.  Cf. Mattei et al. (2009), 
supra note 147, at 783-85 (on the French tradition of ‘attestation’).  There was also an abortive 
attempt in the mid-1990s, spearheaded by the judiciary, to introduce the Anglo-British post of the 
Master to ensure better case management in pending cases. 
 157. Ganado (1996), supra note 49, at 232; see J.M. Ganado, Maltese Law, 29 J. COMP. 
LEGIS. & INT’L L. (3d series) 32, 38 (1947). 
 158. Cremona (1964), supra note 47, at 572. 
 159. Cf. Bron McKillop, Anatomy of a French Murder Case, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 527 
(1997). 
 160. Criminal Code § 397 states: 
The court may order the attendance of any witness and the production of any evidence 
which it may deem necessary, as well as the issue of any summons or warrant of arrest 
against any other principal or accomplice whom the court may discover.  The court may 
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not have any adjudicative function.  Evidence gathered is sent to the 
Attorney General for his decision as to whether to issue a bill of 
indictment before the Criminal Court.  To repeat, no legal system is 
purely investigative or adversarial.161  Continental jurisdictions are also 
accusatorial to different degrees.162  Many include juries of different sorts, 
often borrowed and adapted from the Anglo-American traditions, or 
involve the participation of lay judges for the prosecution of serious 
crimes.163  In sum, Maltese civil procedures and criminal laws and 
procedures are mixed, but in a manner distinct from the leading members 
of the ‘third legal family’. 
C. Legal Structures 
 The Maltese courts are more centralized than most continental 
jurisdictions.  Except for the division between civil and criminal matters, 
there are no specialized separate court hierarchies.  Unlike many 
jurisdictions, Anglo-American and continental, there is no single superior 
court over both the ordinary civil and criminal courts.  There are, 
however, some specialized courts within the ordinary court structures.  
No Anglo-American courts of Equity have ever existed in Malta.164  
                                                                                                                  
likewise order any inquest, search, experiment or any other thing necessary for the 
fullest investigation of the case. 
See also Vincent de Gaetano, Attorney-General, Magistrates and the Police:  The Maltese System, 
15 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 301 (1989). 
 161. Considerable differences exist between even American and British law.  See William 
T. Pizzi, Discovering Who We Are:  An English Perspective on the Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1027 (1996). 
 162. See generally CRAIG M. BRADLEY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  A WORLDWIDE STUDY 
(1999). 
 163. See, e.g., Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems:  An American on 
Trial for an American Murder in the Cour d’Assises, (2001) U. ILL. L. REV. 791; Yue Ma, Lay 
Participation in Criminal Trials:  A Comparative Perspective, 8 INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE REV. 74 
(1998).  But note also that comparativists have often noted that the baroque rules necessitated by 
jury trials—especially in the cynical, if cinematic, American variant—do not guarantee truth or 
justice.  John Henry Merryman noted (of another unnamed scholar): 
He said if he were innocent, he would prefer to be tried by a civil law court, but that if 
he were guilty, he would prefer to be tried by a common law court.  This is, in effect, a 
judgment that criminal proceedings in the civil law world are more likely to distinguish 
accurately between the guilty and the innocent. 
Donlan, The Jury and the Common Law:  Review Article of JW Cairns and G MacLeod (eds), 
“The Dearest Birth Right of the People of England”:  The Jury in the History of the Common 
Law (2002), (2003) 25 DUBLIN UNIV. L.J. (new series) 277 (2003, quoting JOHN HENRY 
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE 
AND LATIN AMERICA ((2d ed.) 1985), 133).  The unnamed scholar appears to have been Rudolf B. 
Schlesinger.  See Mattei et al. (2009), supra note 147, at 855. 
 164. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 36-37, 53; Palmer (2006), supra note 29, at 469-70. 
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Simplified, Malta’s ‘ordinary’ courts may be divided into civil and 
criminal jurisdictions in the following manner: 
COURTS165 
Civil jurisdiction Criminal jurisdiction 
Constitutional Court  
Court of Appeal Court of Criminal Appeal 
Civil Court Criminal Court 
Court of Magistrates166 
As in many jurisdictions, Maltese judges and magistrates may formally 
sit, or belong to, several courts at the same time.  Judges and magistrates 
are drawn from the ‘Bench of Judges’ and the ‘Magistrature’ respectively.  
In most of the lower courts, a single decision-maker presides over the 
court.  This is a magistrate in the Court of Magistrates and a judge in the 
Civil Court.  The Criminal Court, however, usually sits with a single 
judge and a jury of nine.  The Court of Magistrates exercises both civil 
and criminal jurisdiction (as a Court of Criminal Judicature or a Court of 
Inquiry, where it conducts a preliminary investigation in respect to 
criminal offences).  The Civil Court includes: 
(i) A ‘First Hall’ with responsibility for civil and commercial matters 
exceeding the jurisdiction of the Court of Magistrates.  It also has 
jurisdiction over administrative matters and human rights causes. 
(ii) A Family Section that handles family-related litigation, mostly 
separation cases. 
(iii) A ‘Voluntary Jurisdiction Section’ that handles applications of a 
civil nature relating to matters such as adoption or tutorship. 
The Court of Appeal and the Court of Criminal Appeal hear appellate 
matters in two ways.  In their ‘inferior jurisdiction’, individual members 
of those courts exercise appellate jurisdiction over civil and criminal 
matters respectively from the Court of Magistrates.  In their ‘superior 
jurisdiction’, the courts sit with its three judges to exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over the Civil Court and the Criminal Court respectively.  
                                                 
 165. A more detailed chart is available at www.judiciarymalta.gov.mt/file.aspx?f=508 (last 
visited 6 Apr. 2011).  For a good overview of the comparative organization of justice, see Mattei 
et al. (2009), supra note 147, at 490 et seq. 
 166. Magistrates also sit in Juvenile Courts for people under the age of sixteen.  These are 
separate from the ordinary criminal courts and the magistrate is assisted by two lay people—one 
of whom must be a woman—with whom he may consult.  Note that there is also a Court of 
Revision of Notarial Acts responsible for disciplining notaries for any transgression of the law 
they commit.  It is established by the Notarial Profession and Notarial Archives Act, Chapter 55 
of the Laws of Malta, available at http://www.mjha.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom& 
itemid=8608 (last visited 6 Apr. 2011). 
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The Maltese appellate courts are courts of ‘revision’ rather than 
‘cassation’.  That is, their decision is substituted for that of the lower 
court.  This is true, of course, of Anglo-American and most continental 
appellate courts as well as those of the ‘third legal family’.  Finally, there 
also exists a system of judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals which deal 
with civil, administrative and public law matters as is the case with the 
Rent Regulation Board, the Rural Leases Control Board, the 
Administrative Review Tribunal, the Small Claims Tribunal, the 
Consumer Claims Tribunal and the Commissioners for Justice. 
 The Constitutional Court is also unique in some respects.167  Its 
original jurisdiction is confined to deciding matters related to the election 
to and membership of the House of Representatives.168  Its appellate 
jurisdiction is limited to appeals from the Civil Court, First Hall and 
includes matters regulated by the Constitution or the European 
Convention Act which incorporated the E.C.H.R. into Maltese law.169  
While Maltese public law is largely Anglo-British in substance, the 
creation of a centralized court of limited jurisdiction over public law 
matters more closely resembles continental courts of public law.  And, 
unlike the ‘Supreme Court’ of the United States and, more recently, the 
United Kingdom, the Maltese Constitutional Court is not the highest 
appellate court for civil, criminal, and public law matters.170  Instead, the 
Court of Appeal is the highest appellate court for ordinary civil matters.  
Constitutional or ‘judicial’ review in the Maltese Constitutional Court is 
centralized, a posteriori, and concrete.  That is, it is the only court entitled 
to interpret the Constitution.  It does so only after the promulgation of a 
law and on the basis of a real legal dispute.  There is no a priori or 
abstract review, such as exists in both continental jurisdictions and some 
Anglo-American systems such as Canada and Ireland.  And, unlike 
British public law, in which parliament was neither bound in the past by 
                                                 
 167. The Maltese Chief Justice normally presides as President of the Constitutional Court, 
as well as of the Court of Appeal and the Court of Criminal Appeal in their superior jurisdiction.  
The Chief Justice is appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister from suitably 
qualified advocates, magistrates, or judges.  In practice, the Prime Minister also consults with 
both the Minister for Justice and the Chief Justice in making judicial appointments. 
 168. See also Malta, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 10 NEW EU MEMBER STATES 
(Constantijn A.J.M. Kortmann, Joseph Fleuren & Wim Voermans eds., 2007). 
 169. Note that this was done by ordinary statute.  See generally Vincent de Gaetano (then 
Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court of Malta), The Criteria of the Limitation of Human 
Rights in the Practice of Constitutional Justice—Report of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Malta, from the Conference of European Constitutional Courts—XIIIth Congress, 
available at www.judiciarymalta.gov.mt/file.aspx?f=425 (last visited 31 Mar. 2011)). 
 170. American and British constitutional structures are, of course, also quite distinct from 
one another.  See Atiyah & Summers, supra note 9. 
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the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords nor is 
bound in the present by the current Supreme Court, the judgments of 
Malta’s Constitutional Court bind its parliament as well as the parties 
involved and the other institutions of the state.  Whenever the Court 
declares a law, or any part of a law, unconstitutional or in violation of the 
E.C.H.R., the Maltese Parliament is meant to take immediate action to 
alter the law accordingly.171  In practice, this doesn’t always happen.  
There are provisions which have not been repealed by Parliament 
notwithstanding a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court.  Of 
course, even without such legislative corrections, subsequent litigants are 
unlikely to find the Court eager to alter its earlier decisions.  In addition, 
as a member of the E.U. and a signatory of the E.C.H.R., European 
judicial institutions are also important.  Appeals may, as a result, be 
available to either the Court of Justice of the European Union or the 
European Court of Human Rights respectively.172 
 Although Malta’s civil procedure, its hybrid criminal law, and 
perhaps even its public law set it apart from many classical mixed 
jurisdictions, it nevertheless shares much in common with Palmer’s ‘third 
legal family’.  As noted, he maintains that a common pattern of 
“penetration and resistance” exists in the jurisdictions he examined.173  
Here Malta is little different.  Palmer suggests that in the ‘third legal 
family’, the Anglo-American influence on obligations, especially delicts 
or torts, is significant while property law is largely unaffected.174  Indeed, 
he argues that areas like tort reveal how the brevity and economy of 
continental principles can act as gateways for the introduction of Anglo-
American doctrines.175  In Malta, too, delicts or torts have been 
                                                 
 171. For a slightly dated discussion of the Constitutional Court and human rights, see 
Carmel A. Aguis & Nancy A. Grosselfinger, Malta, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL 
POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995), 399.  See more generally CARLO 
GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER OF JUDGES (Cheryl A. Thomas (English ed.), 
2002). 
 172. See Ivan Sammut, Malta and European Union law, in THE APPLICATION OF EU LAW 
IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES:  BRAVE NEW WORLD (Adam Lezoski ed., 2010). 
 173. Cf. Palmer (2009), supra note 29, at 344. 
 174. Palmer (2006), supra note 29, at 472.  “Tort is the area par excellence of common law 
penetration.”  Palmer, The Fate of the General Clause in a Cross-Cultural Setting:  The Tort 
Experience of Louisiana, in Smits (2001), supra note 27, at 105. 
 175. His 
thesis is that the mixed-jurisdiction mind instinctively seeks to narrow and reduce 
broad civilian tort principle into smaller focused liability categories. . . .  This mentalité 
resists the logic of open-ended syllogistic development, preferring a cautious, 
pragmatic case by case expansion of liability.  A general clause in these surroundings 
was not destined to be an exercise in detached reason but in large measure the self-
portrait of a dominant culture. 
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significantly influenced by Anglo-British models.  The trust has also 
been introduced, though relatively recently.  Palmer also argues that, in 
the ‘third legal family’, succession law is somewhat resistant, though 
pressure for freedom of testation has altered the laws of some 
jurisdictions.176  In Malta, continental succession law has largely 
survived.177  For practical reasons, Anglo-American commercial laws 
were also adopted with little resistance in the ‘third legal family’.178  
Maltese commercial law was drawn from a variety of pan-European 
sources, not least Roman law, and redacted into a Commercial Code 
(1857) modeled on the French Commercial Code (1807).  Over time, 
especially since the mid-twentieth century, first legislation, then judicial 
development, brought about a major shift towards British models.  
Anglo-British commercial laws now coexist, or compete, with a 
shrinking Commercial Code.  The ease with which Anglo-American 
laws, such as trusts, have been adopted in the present day owes much to 
the flexible and pragmatic mindset developed by local jurists on the 
hybrid base created in the early nineteenth century.  As in many legal 
traditions, whether mixed or nominally pure, it may also be partly 
explained by the cultural, political, economic hegemony of Anglo-
American laws and legal institutions.  As Palmer wrote: 
Commercial law follows market dynamics. Anglo-American commercial 
law has everywhere replaced the law of merchants originally in place, 
partly because of relatively weaker cultural attachment to commercial 
rules, but more decisively because of pressure to conform to the dominant 
surrounding economy.179 
This is no less true for Malta. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 All legal traditions are hybrids created in significant part by the 
diffusion of laws.  Indeed, as H.D. Hazeltine wrote some eight decades 
ago, 
[n]o body of law is ever, even for a single moment, in a state of absolute 
repose; for it is of the nature of law to be restless.  Law is continually 
                                                                                                                  
Id. at 109. 
 176. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 57. 
 177. The earlier institution of the societa’ coniugale, possibly of Germanic origin, had 
established a community property system in which a third of family property belong, respectively, 
to the father, mother, and children. 
 178. Palmer (2001), supra note 10, at 53-59, 66-76; Palmer (2006), supra note 29, at 471-
72, 474. 
 179. Palmer (2009), supra note 29, at 344. 
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moving, changing, in response to the pressure of the forces that arise in the 
inner life of the community or that penetrate from outside; and one of the 
most important of these external forces is the introduction of foreign legal 
influence.  Whenever a body of law comes into contact with other systems, 
it ceases to preserve its native character intact; it takes on new colours of 
form and content derived from foreign law.  In all of the periods of legal 
history, from early antiquity to the present day, the play of these foreign 
influences and counter-influences has produced systems of mixed origin; 
and it would seem, indeed, that no system of civilised law known to history 
has ever been strictly pure, in the sense of being based solely on indigenous 
growths.180 
Even so, Malta is an ‘extraordinary place’, the site of the commingling of 
diverse pan-national legal traditions that continue to thrive side-by-side.  
We have briefly explored the background and broad outlines of Malta’s 
“happy union”.181  We have done so, in part, through the use of Vernon 
Palmer’s scholarship on a select number of ‘classical mixed jurisdictions’ 
that he designates a ‘third legal family’.  Our analysis shows that Malta 
shares much in common with those jurisdictions.  The balance between 
continental private law and Anglo-American criminal and public law is, 
for example, much the same.  Other aspects of the Maltese experience, 
however, differ from those of Louisiana, Quebec, Scotland, etc.  For 
example, Maltese criminal law is itself a hybrid:  its substantive law 
reflects both Anglo-American and continental influence while its 
procedures are more thoroughly anglicized.  On the other hand, Maltese 
civil procedure is significantly ‘investigative’ or ‘inquisitorial’.  The 
strongly adversarial approach of Anglo-American law was not adopted.  
More generally, there does not appear to have been any perceived need 
for a “neo-civilian reaction” against Anglo-American legal influence.  
Maltese law remains a distinct legal hybrid where both Anglo-American 
and continental legal traditions have arguably flourished alongside one 
another.182  Malta’s relationship to other European mixes is complex.  As 
with all mixed systems, Malta suggests the significant limitations of the 
traditional taxonomies of comparative law.  But Malta, with related 
mixed systems, may help, too, to sensitize comparatists to the deeper 
currents of legal complexity and to a more explicitly hybrid legal future, 
including the developing novum ius commune Europaeum.  This will be 
limited, however, unless something can be done about “the lack of 
                                                 
 180. H.D. Hazeltine, The Study of Comparative Legal History, J. SOC’Y PUB. TEACHERS L. 
27, 33 (1927). 
 181. Ganado (1950), supra note 2, at 195. 
 182. Palmer (2009), supra note 29, at 343. 
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adequate legal material on Maltese law” available.183  More generally, 
Malta reminds us that a jurisdiction may fuse different influences into a 
reasonably just and well-functioning legal order.  Of course, if we recall 
that all traditions are hybrids, this should seem obvious.184 
 This assessment of Malta’s legal tradition, largely limited to 
traditional comparative law and formal sources, ideas, and institutions, is, 
however, only a first step.  In order to better understand the deeper 
character of Maltese law, its ‘law in books’, additional scholarship is 
necessary on its ‘law in action’, on the manner in which the law is 
applied in the courts.  This division has often been noted since the work 
of the American legal realists a century ago.  In Roscoe Pound’s classic 
formulation, he wrote that 
if we look closely, distinctions between law in the books and law in action, 
between the rules that purport to govern the relations of man and man and 
those that in fact govern them, will appear, and it will be found that today 
also the distinction between legal theory and judicial administration is often 
a very real and a very deep one.185 
Indeed, this gap is no less real in continental jurisdictions, whatever the 
theory of the bureaucratic and robotic civilian judge.186  But we also 
suggest that understanding the Maltese legal tradition would be 
considerably advanced by “placing state law within wider normative 
orders”.187  As noted, this ‘normative hybridity’ is a far wider concept than 
legal hybridity, including both laws and wider patterns of normative 
ordering and non-state norms.188  It is essential context for understanding 
the laws and legal institutions.  It represents a move beyond Pound’s ‘law 
in action’ to Eugen Erhlich’s ‘living law’, the lived normative orders of 
social life.189  As Erhlich wrote: 
                                                 
 183. Sammut, supra note 26, at 110. 
 184. Where problems exist, they may owe more to internal problems, for example 
particular political and socio-economic tensions which find expression in assertions of cultural 
incompatibly, rather than to ingrained cultural oppositions engendering political conflict. 
 185. Roscoe Pound, The Law in Books and the Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 
(1910). 
 186. See, e.g., Mitchel de S-O-l’E Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits:  Judicial Discourse in 
the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325 (1995); see also DE S-O-L’E LASSER, JUDICIAL 
DELIBERATIONS:  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY, CONTROL, DEBATE 
AND LEGITIMACY (2004). 
 187. Donlan (2010), supra note 12, at 18. 
 188. John Griffiths, The Idea of Sociology of Law and its Relation to Law and Society, in 
LAW AND SOCIOLOGY:  CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES—VOLUME 8 (Michael Freeman ed., 2005). 
 189. See David Nelken, Law in Action or Living Law?:  Back to the Beginning in 
Sociology of Law, 4 LEGAL STUD. 157 (1984); Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law, and Plural Legalities, 
9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 443 (2008).  This arguably tracks a difference between 
American and European understandings of ‘legal consciousness’.  See Marc Hertogh, A 
 
 
 
 
208 TULANE EUROPEAN & CIVIL LAW FORUM [Vol. 27 
 
A social association is a plurality of human beings who, in their relations 
with one another, recognize certain rules of conduct as binding, and, 
generally at least, actually regulate their conduct according to them.  These 
rules are of various kinds, and have various names:  rules of law, of morals, 
of religion, of ethical custom, of honor, of decorum, of tact, of etiquette, of 
fashion.190 
With specific reference to Malta, such an approach is clearly needed to 
bring out, for example, the extent to which formally adversarial civil 
procedure is fused with an inquisitorial legal culture or how judgments in 
the field of tort law can end up acquiring the sort of precedential value 
they should not strictly possess.  However such an approach will make 
new demands on comparatists, requiring that they familiarize themselves 
with the methods of the social sciences or that they find ways to work 
with anthropologist, geographers, and sociologists.  We look forward to 
such a “rapprochement” and active collaboration between jurists and 
social scientists.191 
                                                                                                                  
“European” Conception of a Legal Consciousness:  Rediscovering Eugen Ehrlich, 31 J. L. & 
SOC’Y 457 (2004). 
 190. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (2002 
[1936]), tr. W.L. Moll, 39 (from the original German edition of 1913). 
 191. Annelise Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies, in Reimann & 
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 777; see also Roger Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, 
in Reimann & Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 729; T.W. Bennett, Legal Anthropology and 
Comparative Law:  A Disciplinary Compromise?, 2010 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 1 (2010).  This is 
discussed in greater detail in Donlan (2011), supra note 3. 
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